Where Africa is mentioned in the review, it is to advance the UK’s strategic geopolitical interests with limited consideration of the continent’s own economic development priorities. While Johnson has stated that he wants the UK to be the “investment partner of choice” for Africa, the reality may play out differently.32 Although the UK has trade deals with sixteen out of fifty-four African countries, overall trade with Africa has been declining (see map 2). Trade peaked in 2012 at $43 billion, but fell to about one third of that amount, $14 billion, in 2020 (see figure 1). The UK was also the first non-African country to formally commit to supporting the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement, signing a memorandum of understanding in September 2021.33 Yet the integrated review identifies “poor governance and disorder, particularly in Africa and the Middle East” as factors in rising terrorism and extremism, specifiying the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia, and Kenya as sites for investment in regional stability and defense cooperation.34 The tilt toward Asia in the review implies that Africa might struggle to be heard in the next decade even as the continent seeks to leverage trade for its economic transformation. While other continents are seen as growing economic partners, Africa could again be relegated to the periphery of UK commercial partnerships and investment decisions.
Decreasing Development Engagement
“In 2021 and beyond, Her Majesty’s Government will make tackling climate change and biodiversity loss its number one international priority.” —“Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy,” 32.
In a profound shift, the UK’s top international development priority is now to address climate change and other transnational challenges; poverty reduction has been downgraded. The UK’s decisions to abolish DFID and reduce the budget for ODA—buttressed by explicit expressions of national self-interest in the integrated review—indicate a narrower scope for international development and a reprioritization of focus areas. The UK’s international development priorities will be more fully laid out in a global development policy paper slated for later in 2022. However, in the review itself, climate change and biodiversity are strategic international priorities. These are followed by other transnational challenges that the UK aims to focus on—including health security, migration, illicit finance, and terrorism—and areas crucial to its national interests, such as science and technology trade and cybersecurity.
For African countries, this change will likely result in decreasing development engagement from the UK. The UK government claims that it “will maintain our commitment to Africa, with a particular focus on East Africa and on important partners such as Nigeria, while increasing development efforts in the Indo-Pacific.”35 Yet if ODA cuts persist beyond 2021, the UK’s bilateral aid to Africa—of which about 66 percent was cut in 2021—may never recover.36 At best, it will be funneled more narrowly, with girls’ education and environmental sustainability at the top of the UK’s stated development priorities. The implications could be profound, because Africa receives the largest proportion of UK bilateral ODA allocated to a specific region.37 In 2019, the continent received 50.6 percent of UK ODA ($3.8 billion) compared with Asia’s 41.8 percent ($3.1 billion), the Americas’ 4.1 percent ($311 million), Europe’s 3.2 percent ($240 million), and Oceania’s 0.3 percent ($20 million) (see figure 2). Five of the top ten recipients of UK ODA are African countries: Ethiopia ($382 million), Nigeria ($330 million), South Sudan ($265 million), the Democratic Republic of Congo ($236 million), and Somalia ($224 million).
Africa should expect less concessional and grant financing as more countries graduate toward middle-income status, although other kinds of financial flows could increase. The integrated review explicitly acknowledges this eventuality: “As governments become able to finance their own development priorities, we will gradually move towards providing UK expertise in place of grants and using a variety of financing models to tackle regional challenges in our mutual interests.”38 In theory, reduced ODA flows (either from budget cuts or from the transition to middle-income status) should not foreclose other avenues for development engagement through technical assistance around trade facilitation, support for localization of value chains, and knowledge transfer in specific industries where the UK has a comparative advantage. Climate finance could be another area where the UK devotes considerable resources. Between 2011 and 2017, nearly 5 billion British pounds of UK foreign aid have been spent on 284 climate change projects, with Africa receiving the most regional funding at 826 million pounds.39 The UK hosted the UN Climate Change Conference, the UK’s largest-ever diplomatic summit, in November 2021 in Glasgow.40 CDC plans to devote up to 2 billion pounds (over $2.7 billion) per annum of investments in climate finance, green infrastructure, and digital transformation in the Indo-Pacific and the Carribbean, mainly, but also in some parts of Africa.41
Finally, as concessional financing declines, UK commercial investments in Africa could rise. British private investment flows to Africa have been growing. UK investors accounted for the second-largest FDI stock in Africa of $66 billion in 2019, an increase from $58 billion in 2015, according to the UN Conference on Trade and Development.42 Net UK FDI flows to Africa bounced back from years of contraction to nearly $14 billion in 2018 (a decade-high) and $8 billion in 2019 (see figure 3a). Yet nearly 83 percent of UK FDI stock in Africa is to be found in financial services and the extractive industries of oil, gas, and mining (see figure 3b). Meanwhile, industries such as manufacturing, information and communications, agriculture, construction, and electricity each account for 1 percent or less of total FDI stock in Africa. These latter industries with job creation and transformation potential represent future growth areas in which to attract private investments from UK companies.
Becoming a Science and Tech Superpower
“Our aim is to have secured our status as a Science and Tech Superpower by 2030, by redoubling our commitment to research and development, bolstering our global network of innovation partnerships, and improving our national skills—including by attracting the world’s best and brightest to the UK through our new Global Talent Visa.” —“Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy,”4.
The UK identifies “sustaining strategic advantage through science and technology” as one of its four overarching foreign policy objectives for the next decade.43 This priority placed on leadership in science and technology is driven by the UK’s desire to maintain strategic advantage in a competitive multipolar system. The document’s reiteration of the need to prevent “corruption, manipulation, exploitation or the theft of our intellectual property” anticipates the UK’s eventual position on COVID-19 vaccines and intellectual property at the WTO.44 The UK is one of the countries that blocked proposals at the WTO to temporarily waive intellectual property rights on COVID-19 vaccines at the height of the pandemic, despite the potential of such a measure to help scale up vaccine production around the world.45
In advancing science and technology for strategic advantage, several tools akin to industrial policies will be employed. A “whole-of-UK effort” is proposed in which the government would develop the infrastructure; create the enabling environment for an ecosystem of scientists, researchers, business, and regulators; and work alongside the manufacturing industry to commercialize innovations.46 The UK also aims to attract top global talent to advance the goal of becoming a tech superpower. Through a newly established Office for Talent, the government will focus on high-skilled immigration for top scientists, researchers, and innovators from around the world. High-skilled migration will be achieved through a Global Talent Visa targeting established professionals and a new Graduate Route for international graduates to secure skilled jobs in the UK.47
The UK’s interest in attracting top global talent to become a science and tech superpower creates opportunities and uncertainties around its migration policy for African countries. While the government is clearly prioritizing high-skilled migrants, the fate of other forms of migrants—such as asylum seekers and refugees—is not clear. The promise of a welcoming environment for top talent regardless of nationality confronts the reality of hard borders as the UK visa program remains arbitrary, expensive, time-consuming, and humiliating, especially for Africans. A recent report commissioned by the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Africa found that African nationals seeking to visit the UK for professional or business reasons experience a high level of visa refusals.48 Between September 2016 and September 2018, the refusal rate that African nationals experienced for UK visit visas was 27 percent, over double the average of 12 percent and much higher than the Middle East’s 11 percent, Asia’s 11 percent, and North America’s 4 percent.49
Overall, high-skilled migration policy may be streamlined and simplified to meet the UK’s ambitions in science and technology in the mold of other countries. High-income countries like Australia, Canada, and the United States have long relied on the strategic use of work visas and other migration pathways for skilled professionals. There is also China’s approach of strengthening the global competitiveness of its tech firms by expanding to Africa. The large African diaspora in the UK is a resource that should be utilized. Of the 1.4 million people of African nationality in the UK,50 184,000 (nearly 13 percent) migrated for formal study while 19 percent are in the UK for work-related reasons (see figure 4). Through this diaspora, the UK can strengthen its ties with the home countries of African migrants—especially Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, where fintech and other digital innovations are taking place.
Policy Recommendations
The UK’s integrated review signals a policy reorientation as the British government navigates a more competitive multipolar system. Those interested in African progress—governments, businesses, and civil society on the continent, as well as international partners such as multilaterals, international nongovernmental organizations, and foundations—will be affected by these changes. How should they respond to the UK’s new approach?
What African Stakeholders Should Do
Influence the details of ongoing processes. While the UK government’s new approach to Africa is previewed in the integrated review, some caution should be exercised to avoid reading too much into this strategy. African countries should engage with the UK government in the months and years ahead as it develops the detailed plans underlying the strategy articulated in the review. There are plans to produce a development-specific strategy in 2022, an Africa Strategy has been promised since 2018, and some country-specific consultations are underway. The large and influential African countries mentioned in the review—Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa—as well as the African diaspora in the UK are positioned to help shape those strategies. And the poorer countries most affected by UK decisions to reduce development engagement (such as Ethiopia, Malawi, and Rwanda, for which ODA constitutes more than 50 percent of their government budgets) may choose to work through regional bodies to influence the details of the UK’s Africa engagement.51 Science and technology, high-skilled migration, climate change, and illicit financial flows provide the most fertile areas for possible influence.
Harness opportunities and reduce risk. The five shifts set out in this document give African countries a broad road map for what to expect from the UK over the next decade. African countries will need to navigate this new era with agility to harness opportunities and manage risks. First, they will need to manage risks to progress, including substantial reductions in aid spending and an overall de-emphasis on development. Current aid programs focusing on nonpriority themes and regions of Africa should prepare for severe and possibly permanent cuts to funding. Second, by optimizing opportunities, African governments can leverage the UK’s focus on climate change, global health, illicit finance, and other transnational challenges to push for more decisive action in these areas. In a post-Brexit context, the UK is eager to strike trade deals and encourage investment to replace the relationship with the European Union. African countries, particularly the larger economies, can aim to negotiate investment and trade deals that support technology and knowledge sharing in specific industries. Through its Global Talent Visa program, the UK could attract top talent from Africa in coordinated knowledge exchange programs. African business in turn can strengthen and leverage ties with the diaspora in the UK toward this aim. African civil society might similarly find a willing partner in the UK to focus on civil rights and democracy. Opportunities exist to forge partnerships.
Negotiate for their own priorities. African countries can negotiate, collectively and with other allies, elements of the vision laid out in the UK’s integrated review with an eye toward Africa’s own development priorities. The demotion of development may not align with the priorities of African countries and their multilateral partners that aspire to raise income levels in specific areas. For instance, in bilateral and multilateral economic relations involving poorer countries, the UK could double down on a free-market approach. Such an approach is at odds with African interests in economic transformation through Agenda 2063, regional integration in the African Continental Free Trade Area, and country-specific development strategies that will require increased government coordination. African governments wanting to implement industrial policies, such as higher taxes and public investments, that do not follow the free-market tradition may not find a willing ally in the UK and should work collectively through subregional and continental bodies. On other issues—such as climate finance, COVID-19 vaccines, fairer global taxation, and illicit financial flows—African governments, business, and civil society may have to find the right international allies among multilaterals, bilaterals, and foundations around the world.
What Other International Partners Should Do
Adapt to, compensate for, and complement shifting UK priorities. Other international partners of Africa must come to terms with the gaps that will be left by less UK aid and then compensate for them. Some African countries, such as Nigeria and South Africa, will barely notice the UK’s new direction, aid being such a small share of their national income. Others, like Ethiopia, Malawi, Rwanda, and Uganda, may be significantly affected. Development actors, including multilateral agencies and philanthropic organizations, should be prepared to adapt to changes in concessional funding and reduced interest from the UK in key programs, including trust funds at the World Bank and UN agencies, to which the UK is often a major contributor (such as the Nigeria Economic Reform and Governance Project, the Ethiopia Protection of Basic Services fund, the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan, Multisectoral Technical Assistance in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Cooperation in International Waters in Africa).52 Likewise, development actors should be prepared to complement areas where the UK may expand its engagement, including on climate and health security.
Prepare for a new normal. The direction the UK government communicated in the integrated review is likely to be foundational to its thinking in the years to come. Other high-income countries, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, may follow suit given the prevalent trends of a new multipolar order.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Juliette Ovadia, Jimmy Vulembera, and Alexander Csanadi for research assistance.
Notes
1 UK Cabinet Office, “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy,” updated July 2, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy.
2 Ibid., 4.
3 Zainab Usman, “What Do We Know About Chinese Lending in Africa?,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/02/what-do-we-know-about-chinese-lending-in-africa-pub-84648; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “United Kingdom,” in Development Co-operation Profiles (Paris: OECD Publishing), 2021, https://doi.org/10.1787/ff4da321-en; and “Distribution of Net ODA,” OECD Data, accessed January 31, 2022, https://data.oecd.org/oda/distribution-of-net-oda.htm#indicator-chart.
4 Author calculations from “Population and Migration,” UK Office for National Statistics, accessed August 2021, https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration.
5 UK Cabinet Office, “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy,” 5.
6 “Spending Review 2020 and OBR Forecast,” UK Parliament, November 25, 2020, https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2020-11-25/debates/6437F778-628F-48A1-ADF3-C06BA1C09EBA/SpendingReview2020AndOBRForecast.
7 UK Cabinet Office, “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy,” 47.
8 HM Treasury, Department for International Development, “UK Aid: Tackling Global Challenges in the National Interest,” November 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-aid-tackling-global-challenges-in-the-national-interest.
9 UK Cabinet Office, “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy,” 11.
10 Ibid., 12.
11 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: Managing Divergent Recoveries (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, April 2021), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2021/03/23/world-economic-outlook-april-2021.
12 Matthew Smith, “Two Thirds of Britons Support Cutting the Foreign Aid Budget,” YouGov, November 25, 2020, https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2020/11/25/two-thirds-britons-support-cutting-foreign-aid-bud.
13 Remarks by President Biden in Address to a Joint Session of Congress, White House, April 20, 2021, retrieved January 10, 2022, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/29/remarks-by-president-biden-in-address-to-a-joint-session-of-congress/.
14 “GDP (Current US$),” World Bank Data, accessed January 28, 2022, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=1998&most_recent_value_desc=true&start=1995.
15 Philip Aldrick, “Britain Is Fifth-Largest Economy in World Again After Leapfrogging India,” Times, December 26, 2020, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/britain-is-fifth-largest-economy-in-world-again-after-leapfrogging-india-wccxxxcqr.
16 UK Cabinet Office, “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy,” 6.
17 Ibid., 5.
18 Nic Cheeseman, “The Conflict in Ethiopia Calls Into Question Authoritarian Aid,” Carnegie Europe, December 22, 2020, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/12/22/conflict-in-ethiopia-calls-into-question-authoritarian-aid-pub-83515.
19 “A Patent Waiver on COVID Vaccines Is Right and Fair,” Nature, May 25, 2021, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-01242-1.
20 CDC Group, “Our Fossil Fuel Policy,” December 12, 2020, https://assets.cdcgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/12150401/CDC-fossil-fuel-policy_December-2020_FINAL.pdf.
21 Karla Adam, “Britain Announces Its Largest Military Investment Since the Cold War,” Washington Post, November 19, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/britain-military-spending/2020/11/19/f1483834-29de-11eb-9c21-3cc501d0981f_story.html.
22 Boris Johnson, “PM Statement to the House on the Integrated Review: 19 November 2020,” UK Prime Minster’s Office, November 19, 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-to-the-house-on-the-integrated-review-19-november-2020.
23 Neil Melvin, “The Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa Region,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April 2019, 2, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/sipribp1904_1.pdf; Emma Sjökvist, “The United Kingdom – Training Troops and Maintaining Influence in Africa,” Swedish Defence Research Institute, FOI memo 6813, August 2019, https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI%20Memo%206813; Phil Miller, “Revealed: The UK Military’s Overseas Base Network Involves 145 Sites in 42 Countries,” Daily Maverick, November 24, 2020, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-11-24-revealed-the-uk-militarys-overseas-base-network-involves-145-sites-in-42-countries; Laura Makin-Isherwood, “What Are British Troops Doing in Kenya?,” Forces.net, August 1, 2018, https://www.forces.net/news/defence-secretary-makes-first-africa-visit; J. Vittor Tossini, “The British Forces in Africa – The Training Unit in Kenya,” UK Defence Journal, March 30, 2017, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-british-forces-in-africa-the-training-unit-in-kenya; Defence Infrastructure Organisation, “Defence Secretary Opens £70-Million British Army Facility in Kenya,” UK Ministry of Defence, February 24, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-opens-70-million-british-army-facility-in-kenya; “Op TANGHAM: British Military Train Somali Army in Baidoa,” JointForcesMedia, June 2, 2021, https://www.joint-forces.com/uk-operations/43813-op-tangham-british-military-train-somali-army-in-baidoa; “2nd Phase of Joint Anti-poaching Training by British Military Starts in KNP,” Zambian Ministry of Tourism and Arts, accessed January 31, 2022, https://www.mota.gov.zm/?p=5999; Dickie Davis, “The British Experience in Africa and Oman,” PRISM, National Defense University, November 20, 2017, https://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/1375921/12-the-british-experience-in-africa-and-oman; “Navy Support Facility Diego Garcia: In-depth Overview,” MilitaryINSTALLATIONS, accessed January 31, 2022, https://installations.militaryonesource.mil/in-depth-overview/navy-support-facility-diego-garcia; “Partners,” African Parks, accessed January 31, 2021, https://www.africanparks.org/the-parks/nkhotakota/partners; and “About Us,” Horton Academy, accessed January 31, 2022, https://hortonacademysl.com/about/about.php.
24 Emma Sjökvist, “The United Kingdom – Training Troops and Maintaining Influence in Africa,” Swedish Defence Research Institute, FOI Memo 6813, August 2019, https://www.foi.se/en/foi/research/security-policy/africa.html.
25 “UK Successfully Concludes UN Mission in South Sudan,” Army Technology, January 31, 2020, https://www.army-technology.com/news/uk-un-mission-south-sudan/.
26 UK Cabinet Office, “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy,” 45.
27 Mathieu Olivier, “Russie-Afrique: Wagner, enquête sur les mercenaires de Poutine,” Jeune Afrique, July 26, 2021, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1204638/politique/russie-afrique-wagner-enquete-sur-les-mercenaires-de-poutine/.
28 See Liengu Etaka Esong, “French Investors Prospect in Douala,” Cameroon Tribune, July 22, 2021, https://www.cameroon-tribune.cm/article.html/41288/en.html/french-investors-prospect-in-douala.
29 CDC Group, “2022–2026 Strategy,” November 2021, https://assets.cdcgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/25085000/CDC-Strategy-Summary-2022-2026.pdf.
30 UK Cabinet Office, “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy,” 14.
31 Ibid., 63.
32 UN Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2021: Investing in Sustainable Recovery (New York: United Nations, 2021), https://unctad.org/webflyer/world-investment-report-2021.
33 “AfCFTA Secretariat Signs Landmark Agreement With UK Government,” Business & Financial Times Online, September 13, 2021, https://thebftonline.com/13/09/2021/afcfta-secretariat-signs-landmark-agreement-with-uk-government/.
34 UK Cabinet Office, “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy,” 32.
35 Ibid., 46.
36 Patrick Wintour and Karen McVeigh, “African Countries Facing 66% Cut in UK Aid, Charities Say,” Guardian, April 28, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/apr/28/african-countries-facing-66-cut-in-uk-aid-charities-say.
37 “Statistics on International Development: Final UK Aid Spend 2019,” UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, updated July 20, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/statistics-on-international-development-final-uk-aid-spend-2019/statistics-on-international-development-final-uk-aid-spend-2019.
38 UK Cabinet Office, “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy,” 46.
39 Rosamund Pearce and Leo Hickman, “Mapped: How UK Foreign Aid Is Spent on Climate Change,” Carbon Brief, October 10, 2017, https://www.carbonbrief.org/mapped-how-uk-foreign-aid-is-spent-climate-change.
40 Elena Ares, “COP26: The International Climate Change Conference, Glasgow, UK,” UK House of Commons Library research briefing, July 21, 2021, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8868/.
41 CDC Group, “2022–2026 Strategy.”
42 UN Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2021: Investing in Sustainable Recovery.
43 UK Cabinet Office, “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy,” 35.
44 Ibid., 7.
45 “Rich, Developing Nations Wrangle Over COVID Vaccine Patents,” Reuters, March 10, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-wto/rich-developing-nations-wrangle-over-covid-vaccine-patents-idUSKBN2B21V9.
46 Ibid., 35.
47 Ibid., 37.
48 Paul Asquith, Henrietta Bailey, David Hope-Jones, Ambreena Manji, and Nick Westcott, “Visa Problems for African Visitors to the UK: A Joint All-Party Parliamentary Group Report by the APPG for Africa, the APPG for Diaspora, Development & Migration and the APPG for Malawi,” July 16, 2019, https://royalafricansociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/APPG-Report-on-Visa-problems-for-African-visitors-to-the-UK_v1.58web.pdf.
49 Ibid.
50 “Population and Migration,” UK Office for National Statistics, accessed August 2021, https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration.
51 “Net ODA Received (% of Central Government Expense)—Ethiopia, Malawi, Rwanda,” World Bank Data, accessed January 31, 2022, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.XP.ZS?locations=ET-MW-RW.
52 “UK-DFID TF Contributions by Fund,” World Bank Group Finances, https://finances.worldbank.org/Trust-Funds-and-FIFs/UK-DFID-TF-contributions-by-Fund/vxg9-sy97.
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