Germany’s elections show that resentment over immigration is threatening the system of open borders within Europe. EU states and their neighbors need to cooperate more closely, and should approach the problem from an economic perspective.
Will fences secured with barbed wire soon appear again at the EU’s internal borders? If Europe wants to preserve its current freedoms, a more unified and strategic migration policy is crucial.
Christian Ohde / Imago
Europe’s politicians are feeling the effects of public pressure. The triumphant successes of radical right-wing and left-wing parties in Germany, France, Italy and potentially in Austria reflects widespread dissatisfaction with the political status quo. Moreover, they are a sign that the fear of unchecked migration has become a central political issue. Terrorist attacks such as the recent stabbing at a town festival in Solingen, Germany, have heightened public fears surrounding the perceived threat posed by foreign nationals. In Switzerland, a milder version of this anxiety is fueling debates about the country’s population growth, a concern championed by right-populist Swiss People’s Party.
Germany has responded by introducing new systematic border controls aimed at deterring asylum-seekers and signaling to the public that the government is regaining control over the situation. The measures also seek to prevent other countries from simply waving refugees across Germany’s borders, or even helping them to transit through, as has often been the case in the past.
The countries most directly affected by Germany’s new measures now have an incentive to turn refugees away at their own borders. According to Europe’s so-called Dublin rules, participating countries can in principle transfer refugees to the first safe country in which the individuals arrived – that is, the country where they first entered the Schengen-Dublin area. If applied consistently, this would mean that asylum-seekers would disproportionately wind up in countries on the EU’s external border. This would include Italy, Greece, Spain and Poland, which already bear the brunt of managing migration flows. Germany’s decision jeopardizes the achievement of a Europe united without internal borders (though still with cross-border coordination between police forces) in the Schengen Area.
More asylum-seekers crowding into a few countries
So, how dire is the situation really, and what can be done about it?
The number of asylum-seekers coming to Europe has surged once again since the end of the pandemic, even when excluding the Ukrainians seeking protection from the horrors of war. Last year alone, more than 1 million first-time applications were filed, or 0.2% of the population, bringing Europe closer to the migration levels seen in 2015, when large numbers of Syrians sought protection in Europe.
The composition of these refugee flows highlights the political instability driving many to flee. For example, Afghans, Syrians and Venezuelans are fleeing civil war, persecution and economic collapse. However, Europe cannot take them all in.
Others, such as Georgians or Turks, or even many of the Africans who make the difficult journey across the Mediterranean, face long odds of being granted asylum in Europe. However, some evidently believe they will be able to remain while their cases are processed, or may perhaps even stay while evading authorities’ attention. For many, options such as these offer the only available prospect of being able to live and work in Europe for a while. Unlike African migrants, nationals from Latin America or even Georgia, for whom the visa requirement has been abolished, can simply fly into the Schengen Area.
For those outside the EU, the primary channels into Europe’s major destination countries are through asylum applications or family reunification. Third-country nationals often marry people from their home country.
Over the past 11 years, the vast majority of asylum-seekers coming to Europe have sought protection within Germany, France, Italy, Spain or Sweden. In addition, other people from non-EU countries have come to Europe for purposes of education, for work or to seek temporary refuge from the war in Ukraine.
If the asylum applications submitted for the first time between 2013 and 2023 are combined with the residence permits granted for at least 12 months to non-EU immigrants, it becomes evident that a small number of destination countries shoulder the bulk of the burden.
Few labor migrants, many Ukrainians
Of the total 25.8 million residence permits issued to third-country nationals throughout the EU and Switzerland over the past 11 years, 5.9 million were granted in Germany, 3.8 million in France, 3.1 million in Spain, 2.3 in Italy and 1.7 million in Poland. According to these figures, Switzerland granted 534,000 residence permits to immigrants from outside the EU during this period, while Austria granted 527,000 (although it is highly unlikely that everyone granted a permit still resides in these countries today).
This also shows that legal labor migration from outside the EU remains a relatively small share. In total, only 4.19 million of these individuals, or 16.2%, entered the EU for employment purposes.
The previous years’ flows of asylum-seekers have now been joined by those from Ukraine seeking protection. Over the past two years, a total of 1.3 million people have applied for asylum in the EU or Switzerland combined, but 4.1 million Ukrainians have been granted protected status.
Refugees and those immigrating from outside the EU or Switzerland for purposes of family reunification generally take a very long time to integrate into their host country’s labor market. According to a new study by migration expert Rainer Münz, among men aged 20 to 64 who have been in the Destination country for less than five years, only about half are employed. For women, this figure is only around one-quarter. Among men, it takes about 10 years for this population to reach an overall employment rate of around two-thirds – that is, the same level as among immigrants who originally came to take up jobs. For women, it takes more than 15 years to achieve similar integration.
It is therefore fair to say that immigration pressure from non-EU countries has indeed increased significantly since the end of the pandemic, and that this is distributed very differently within Europe under the current policy regime. To be sure, Europe’s average age will begin to rise at an accelerating pace in the coming years, and the continent will therefore need immigration. However, as seen purely from a labor market perspective, the majority of today’s arrivals are not the workers the economy needs.
A focus on prices, opportunities and deterrence
A more efficient refugee and migration policy should therefore prevent large numbers of rapidly arriving economic migrants from overwhelming the absorption capacity of European destination countries – without thereby forcing these countries to stop offering humanitarian protection to genuinely threatened and persecuted people. Admittedly, this is not easy, and requires cooperation.
Limit the benefits of unauthorized migration. People who have no legal right to settle in Europe, either for humanitarian reasons or for labor-market purposes, should expect minimal benefits if they try to do so anyway. This can be achieved by tightening external border controls, rather than closing borders within the Schengen Area, speeding up application processing, and ensuring swift deportation and expulsion for those without legal grounds to stay. Visa-free regimes could be offered to non-EU countries that implement quick and efficient readmission processes.Encourage readmission. In many cases, repatriation of people whose asylum applications have been rejected is not possible, because the countries of origin do not want to take back their emigrants. Many governments have no incentive to prevent their citizens from emigrating to the promised land of Europe. Successful emigrants transfer money back to their country of origin instead of possibly being unemployed at home. Governments that are prepared to take back emigrants should therefore be rewarded for doing so. Under certain circumstances, development aid might help alleviate the conditions driving emigration, though direct payments to deportees risk being used to fund further attempts to emigrate.Enhance deterrence. Reducing the incentive to migrate requires stronger deterrents. Widely known policies that immediately deport individuals lacking asylum approval to safe third countries could diminish the appeal of unauthorized migration. Diverting large numbers of refugees to Rwanda, as has been proposed by conservatives in the United Kingdom and Germany, does not appear feasible. However, a «third country model» of this kind could help to reduce the appeal of an asylum procedure.Create alternative immigration options. The offer of legal immigration pathways will not eliminate refugee pressure, as can be seen in the United States. But the possibility of acquiring immigration permits (green cards) within countries of origin opens up a less dangerous way for economic migrants to try their luck. Immigration could this way be aligned more closely with the needs of the labor market, for example by focusing on applicants with certain skill profiles, or even by helping people develop such skills in their home countries.Improving the integration of legal residents. A coherent immigration strategy must be paired with an active integration policy. Participation in the labor market is the single most effective integration mechanism. Anyone who receives a residence permit for whatever reason should be provided with strong incentives to take up paid employment. Family reunification and support payments could be linked to the acquisition of at least basic language and cultural skills. Moreover, it must be worthwhile for households to seek additional earnings. If further education or training is required to enable adequate employment, this too should be supported.Improve cooperation. The Schengen system depends on cooperation between the participating states. This falters when border states are left to deal with their problems alone. A stronger financial burden-sharing system and a commitment to shared responsibility for asylum-seekers are necessary. Countries that have historically received fewer asylum-seekers should be incentivized or compensated by all Schengen countries to take on a more active role.
There are no simple solutions. However, imposing strict national border controls should be no more than an emergency solution, maintained only until coordinated measures take effect.
Enabling the positive
Migration, fundamentally, is a positive force. It’s typically the most dynamic and motivated individuals who take the risk of moving to another country, whether to escape hardship, seek education, pursue work, or start a business. Without immigration, Europe would be far less innovative and diverse. And without immigration, Europe’s rapidly aging societies will swiftly ossify. The populists, whether from the right or left, are stoking fears that must be addressed – not by rejecting immigration, but by ensuring it remains a positive force for Europe’s future.
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Publish date : 2024-09-26 01:14:00
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