European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has demonstrated strong leadership. But much more will be required to navigate the complex obstacles ahead.
Ursula von der Leyen has served as president of the European Commission since December 2019.
Christoph Soeder / AP
Will the European Union remain a key player in the emerging global order, or will it lose relevance? This is the question many commentators are asking after Ursula von der Leyen unveiled the new European Commission in Brussels last week.
One thing is clear: The conditions that allowed the Union to expand from 12 member states after World War II to its current 27 in the wake of the Cold War no longer exist. After 1989, many in the West believed that the global adoption of a U.S.-led political and economic model was both desirable and achievable. That belief has since proved to be an illusion.
Today, we are witnessing the rise of a multipolar world. The process appears chaotic, often violent and associated with an increase in military conflicts. Isolationism, nationalism and protectionism are gaining ground in many parts of the globe. This is almost the antithesis of the environment in which the EU grew into an economic powerhouse – and in which it nevertheless remained a political and especially a military lightweight.
Can the EU maintain its status as an economic powerhouse and also become a significant geopolitical force? In seeking to do so, it faces three major challenges.
1. Political polarization
A tattered Green Party campaign poster in the German state of Thuringia offers symbolic testimony to the shifts in the political landscape. Political rhetoric in Germany and elsewhere is becoming more abrasive.
Imago
Extremist movements on both the left and right are gaining momentum in many European countries, including the EU’s two largest members, Germany and France. In Berlin, the governing «traffic light» coalition – named after the colors associated with each of its three parties – is struggling to contain the rise of the far-right Alternative for Germany, or AfD, and the far-left Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance, known as the BSW, in the country’s eastern regions. Meanwhile, in France, the conservative government is reliant on the tolerance of the far-right National Rally, and faces staunch opposition from the left-wing France Unbowed party.
The rise of extremism reflects a broader crisis of confidence. Many voters are increasingly disillusioned with the socioeconomic, political and cultural foundations of their societies. This can be seen in the increasing virulence of the debate over migration, as well as in the intensifying and increasingly intractable culture wars. As a result, some countries have grown vulnerable to authoritarian governance. For example, illiberal democracies have taken root in Hungary, Slovakia and Serbia, where the separation of powers and media freedom are being sacrificed in favor of an all-powerful executive.
This crisis of trust has also made societies more susceptible to Russian disinformation and Chinese and Islamist propaganda. Notably, far-left and far-right parties reject the EU as a universalist and capitalist project. Their strength is weakening the EU at a time when unity and decisive action at the European level are more critical than ever
2. Productivity challenges
La Défense, Europe’s largest office complex, looms over the western outskirts of Paris. Like France itself, Europe is grappling with economic challenges.
Nathan Laine / Bloomberg / Getty
Europe’s economy risks falling behind that of the United States due to insufficient productivity gains. The Draghi report and the ensuing debates over its proposals have only reaffirmed these concerns. The key factor restraining productivity is Europe’s fragmented, nationally structured economy, which lacks the scale to compete with global giants. Europe has few truly large corporations outside of sectors like the automotive industry and health care. Yet the most significant productivity gains are being made in other areas especially in tech and communications. It is the telecommunications sector in particular where regulation in Europe is still strongly focused on the national level – much like in the defense sector.
There remains a tension between the EU’s commitment to competition within the single market and its ambition to foster industries capable of competing with Chinese and American rivals. Mario Draghi, the former European Central Bank president and former Italian prime minister, clearly highlighted this issue in his recent high-profile report on European productivity. The 2019 rejection of the merger between Alstom (France) and Siemens (Germany) offered an example of regulation that strengthens free markets but simultaneously stifles the emergence of firms able to become global leaders, he said.
Like many others, Draghi called for greater integration of national capital markets in order to facilitate access to (venture) capital. Yet some of his report’s other proposals remain divisive. For instance, he estimated that the EU needed to invest an additional €750 billion to €800 billion annually, which he argued should be done jointly, including through joint debt issuance. In Germany, even mentioning joint EU-level debt can bring any discussion of the EU’s competitiveness to an immediate halt. As a result, it remains unclear whether this critical issue will gain political traction, or whether Draghi’s report will instead simply wind up gathering dust.
3. Geopolitical uncertainty
Polish soldiers building a fence at the border with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad in November 2022.
Damian Lemanksi / Bloomberg / Getty
The EU’s foreign policy framework was developed in an era when peace reigned in its neighborhood, multilateralism was prized and international relations were based on rules – at least in theory. That era has ended. The question now is whether the EU can adapt to this new reality.
The European Union Institute for Security Studies has given this some thought. The think tank has proposed abandoning the European Neighborhood Policy, which applied a uniform approach to political and economic relations with neighboring countries. Instead, the institute has argued, the focus should shift to forging deeper ties with strategically important partners, particularly those along the southern Mediterranean, which play a key role in migration-related issues. Von der Leyen’s appointment of a new commissioner specifically tasked with addressing this region was welcomed by many.
EU foreign policy must also involve strengthening EU engagement with difficult partners and competitors, including China. The EU has sufficient leverage as a trading partner to put pressure on Beijing, particularly over its tacit support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. This could also involve gradually integrating Eastern European countries such as Ukraine, Moldova and Armenia, as well as the Western Balkans, into the EU’s common foreign and security policy.
The think tank also suggests elevating the role of the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas. Instead, it argues that she should be given the title of security advisor, akin to the national security advisor in the United States, and that she should be granted greater influence over the bloc’s defense, energy, migration and technology agendas. Lastly, the institute suggests that the EU’s civilian and military missions be consolidated and focused on fewer locations, starting with a military training mission in Ukraine.
These are thoughtful proposals. However, the central question remains: Can the 27 member states reach consensus on these or similar measures, and agree to give up the elements of national foreign-policy sovereignty this would entail? The likelihood appears low.
The prospects of the EU reshaping itself are slim
At present, the EU’s most influential member states, Germany and France, are scarcely visible on the Brussels stage. Like many of their neighbors, they are paralyzed by internal divisions. In economic policy, the question of how the EU can bolster its competitiveness against global rivals remains contentious. On security policy, it is far from certain whether the fragile unity over support for Ukraine will hold in the coming months.
Thus, the chances of the EU making significant strides as a geopolitical actor under the new Commission appear slim. The bloc lacks both the governance framework and the political legitimacy to drive such a transformation. The Commission remains a paper tiger, dependent on the approval of member states for all major decisions – and often even requiring their unanimous consent.
The fact that the president of the Commission is centralizing executive power in her own hands like never before, ruthlessly sidelining rivals, does little to alter this reality. But at least one long-standing question – posed by Henry Kissinger, who famously asked «Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?» – can now be answered, post mortem. The person to call is now clearly Ursula von der Leyen.
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Publish date : 2024-09-29 21:10:00
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