After the election of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in June 2021, Tehran upped its price for returning to JCPOA compliance.REF After back-and-forth negotiations in Vienna, Iran demanded that Washington remove its designation of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as an FTO. The Biden–Harris Administration rightly refused to lift the FTO designation, ending the talks in Vienna in April 2022.REF
Although its efforts to revive the JCPOA failed, reports in June 2023 confirmed that the Biden–Harris Administration was discussing an alternative agreement with Iran.REF The Administration relaxed its enforcement of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s oil exports, dragged its feet on applying new sanctions on Iran, and issued sanctions waivers in June 2023 that authorized the release of $2.76 billion held in escrow in Iraq to repay Iran for exports of natural gas and electricity. Media reports suggested that these steps were part of an informal “mini deal” that would trade sanctions relief with a cap on its stock of 60 percent enriched uranium for a pause in proxy attacks against U.S. forces in the region.
Subsequently, attacks against U.S. forces were less frequent, but Iran did not scale back its enrichment.REF Instead, it continued to add advanced centrifuges and removed 27 cameras that had allowed the IAEA to monitor its nuclear activities over the preceding six yearsREF This action came in response to a resolution against Iran for failing to cooperate with IAEA probes that found uranium traces at three undeclared sites. In September 2023, Iran also expelled one-third of the IAEA enrichment-related nuclear inspectors who were in the country as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty’s Safeguards Agreement to ensure that Iran was not building nuclear weapons.REF
After expressing “concern” over Iran’s lack of IAEA compliance, the Biden–Harris Administration chose to double down on its negotiations with Tehran. In September 2023, the Administration negotiated a controversial deal with Iran to release five American hostages in exchange for five Iranians held in U.S. jails and at least $6 billion of Iranian assets frozen in South Korea.REF This deal was secured despite the expulsion of top IAEA inspectors just days before.REF
Shortly thereafter, on October 7, 2023, armed and supported by Iran, Hamas launched an attack against Israel that unleashed region-wide violence against Israel and the United States. With all eyes on the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, the Iranians have accelerated their nuclear activities with little to no pushback from the United States or Europe. Lack of transparency combined with increasing nuclear capabilities means that Iran is closer than ever to a nuclear breakout.
Breakout Time Zero
According to the May 2024 IAEA report, Iran is continuing to stockpile uranium enriched to between 20 percent and 60 percent.REF In the past, Iran has claimed that its nuclear enrichment is for commercial nuclear use. For comparison, civilian nuclear reactors operate on 3 percent–5 percent enriched uranium.REF One can assume that a country that stockpiles uranium enriched to a level of 60 percent purity—which is only a technical step from 90 percent—is seeking to reach breakout capability for nuclear weapons.
What this means is that, according to then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, Iran could have enough fissile material for a nuclear bomb in “less than two weeks” and produce a nuclear device in “several more months.”REF
Iran is a “latent” nuclear power—one that remains a non-nuclear power by choice. Once it makes the decision to enrich uranium to weapons grade, it will quickly become a nuclear weapon state—and may in fact be able to produce a small number of nuclear weapons before that becomes apparent to other actors. The implications of a nuclearized Iran for the United States, Israel, and the rest of the Middle East will be serious.
Proliferation Among Autocrats: A Short History
To understand what the United States should do now, one must examine the implications of a nuclear-armed Iran. To do so, it is helpful to examine the behaviors of other adversarial states that became nuclear powers.
In September 1949, four years after the U.S. had detonated atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end World War II, the Soviet Union carried out its first post-war nuclear test.REF A month later, the Air Force sent a memorandum to the Director of Intelligence that discussed possible Soviet atomic attacks on targets in the United States and the United Kingdom.REF
Alarmed by these reports, American policymakers called for massive military spending in 1950 to stay ahead of the Soviet Union.REF The history of Europe in the four decades that followed was the history of a continent in which thousands of nuclear weapons were deployed and millions of men were under arms—but also in which a tense and uneasy peace reigned.
By the middle of the Cold War, it was clear that Communist China was close to a nuclear breakout—a development that was deeply troubling for American policymakers. In the days before China tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964, the Department of Defense warned that Chairman Mao’s alarming rhetoric made it unlikely that China would be more cautious as a nuclear power.REF The Department of Defense also argued that China would provide nuclear arms to Vietnam and North Korea and use the threat of nuclear war to drive the United States out of Asia.REF As it turned out, the United States remained in Asia after the Vietnam War, and China refused to help North Korea build a nuclear weapon, despite providing Pakistan with a tested nuclear weapons design and enough weapons-grade uranium for two nuclear weapons in the early 1980s.REF
By the 1970s, North Korean leader Kim II Sung was determined to join the nuclear club. Consequently, Pyongyang began its nuclear program with the assistance of the Soviet Union.REF In 1994, it became clear that North Korea sought an independent nuclear capability: It even threatened to turn Seoul into a “sea of flames” by the mid-1990s. In response, the U.S. military drew up plans to send cruise missiles and F-117 stealth fighters to strike the Yongbyon nuclear reactor. A last-minute intervention by former President Jimmy Carter eventually led to an agreement by North Korea to freeze its nuclear program—thus undercutting a potential chance to strangle the North Korean nuclear program in its cradle.REF
Jimmy Carter’s agreement did not last long. After violating the terms of the agreement on multiple occasions, North Korea reactivated its nuclear plant in Yongbyon, expelled IAEA inspectors in 2003. and detonated its first nuclear weapon within a few short years.REF Since that time, multiple diplomatic attempts—to include the Six Party Talks—and intense economic sanctions have failed to convince the Kim family to halt North Korea’s nuclear program. Instead, the country has conducted multiple nuclear tests and continues to debut a variety of missiles with increasing ranges.
While North Korea, Russia, and China have never employed nuclear weapons against their adversaries, the nuclear status of all three countries empowers them to influence or deter adversaries’ actions. At a minimum, their nuclear arsenals have a major influence on security decision-making in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.
Russia’s nuclear arsenal complicates allied decision-making and NATO support of Ukraine;
China’s nuclear arsenal complicates its ties with the United States and will have implications for a possible defense of Taiwan from a Chinese invasion; and
North Korea’s seemingly endless series of nuclear threats against the United States and its allies in South Korea and Japan also impacts the regional security posture of the Indo-Pacific.
The ability to employ this type of coercive leverage is one of the main reasons why Iran has spent decades developing its nuclear weapons program.
What Should the U.S. Do?
In the decades since the Islamic Republic of Iran came to power in 1979, the regime has made it clear that the United States is public enemy number one and Israel is public enemy number two. Even though Russia, China, and North Korea have never employed their nuclear weapons, there is no guarantee that Iran will show restraint. In fact, the ideological nature of the regime could mean that Iran’s behavior could be quite different from the behavior of other states that have acquired nuclear capabilities.
The United States is at a critical juncture. With Iran inching closer to a nuclear weapon, it is imperative that the United States and its partners are prepared. Therefore, the next presidential Administration should:
Field the capabilities required to destroy Iran’s weapon capabilities, including options for destroying hardened and deeply buried nuclear targets. U.S. intelligence currently indicates that Iran has two hardened and deeply buried targets—the facilities at Natanz and Fordow. The United States must therefore be able and reserve the right to hold at risk whatever targets it deems necessary to deny Iran the ability to field nuclear weapons.
Maximize diplomatic and economic pressure on Tehran by denying it access to resources for nuclear programs. Under the Trump administration, there were more than 1,500 terrorism, missile, and nuclear sanctions targeted against individuals and state institutions. These sanctions cost Tehran over $200 billion from 2018–2021.REF As a result of these sanctions, in 2019 alone, Iran cut its defense spending by 28 percent, 17 percent of which was for IRGC funding.REF Sanctions—when effective—limit Iran’s ability to fund proxies like Hamas, the Houthis, and Hezbollah as well as its nuclear program. Returning to a campaign of maximum diplomatic and economic pressure could seriously limit Iran’s ability to build nuclear weapons.
Support Israel’s defense. For more than four decades, Iran’s rulers have pledged to destroy Israel, which has been and is one of America’s closest partners. The Department of Defense should supply weapons, intelligence, and other aid that Israel requires to defend itself and advocate for Israel’s right to respond to threats. The Department of Defense should also ramp up defense production to meet Israel’s requirements for air and missile defenses, air-to-ground weapons, and other capabilities, such as tanker aircraft and large ordnance systems like the Massive Ordnance Penetrator, while also providing Israel with targeting and other military support when necessary.REF
Expedite arms sales and delivery to Arab allies along with associated training and other support. The Trump Administration successfully developed good working relationships with Arab partners to confront Tehran, but the Biden–Harris Administration chose to favor Iran over regional partners to entice the regime to return to the JCPOA. These efforts failed to secure a nuclear deal and instead alienated Arab partners by ignoring their security concerns. The United States should instead strengthen Arab countries’ ability to deter or defend against Iranian air, maritime, and other threats with more limited U.S. support.
Facilitate increased defense cooperation between Israel and Gulf partners. The Abraham Accords set up a framework that could be used to explore new defense, investment, and political opportunities to bring together Israel and Arab partners under American leadership. Greater consultations, coordination, information-sharing, and technology-sharing between Arab and Israeli partners should focus on countering Iranian air, missile, and maritime threats as well as Iran-sponsored terrorism.
Expand regional missile defenses. Working with regional partners, the United States should expand regional integrated air and missile defenses to defend American interests and deter Iranian aggression, particularly from missile and airborne threats, more effectively. In particular, the U.S. should encourage the development and production of such capabilities among key partners within the region.
Improve regional deterrence presence. The United States should consider an enhanced deterrence posture for the region both to deter Iranian aggression and to assure regional partners. This posture should include bomber assurance and deterrence missions by nuclear-capable bombers and ports of call by key naval assets.
Expand and improve U.S. petroleum refinery capacity. In the past, the U.S. has relied on global oil markets to meet surges in domestic demand, but overseas access to markets could be constrained when Iran acquires nuclear weapons. American refineries are predominantly tuned to process heavy crude oil because most refineries were built before lighter American shale became profitable. To offset the potential loss of heavy refined petroleum products imported from the Middle East, the United States should provide tax incentives to U.S. energy companies to reconfigure, expand, or build new petroleum refineries within the United States.
Revitalize the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). Congress established the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in 1975 to mitigate energy shocks. The SPR is mandated to hold a 90-day reserve of crude oil, which is stored at four sites located in Texas and Louisiana that have a combined capacity of 714 million barrels.REF At the end of the Trump Administration in January 2020, the SPR contained 635 million barrels of crude oil. As of August 2024, the SPR contained 376.5 million barrels of crude oil—almost half of what it held at the end of the Trump Administration.REFA low SPR leaves the energy security of the American people at risk. The United States should replenish the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and potentially expand SPR storage capacity to cushion the impacts of a spike in petroleum prices if Iran achieves nuclear capability.
Ensure that the United States has the capacity to detect ballistic missile launches. The United States has long maintained the ability to detect ballistic missile launches in much of the Northern Hemisphere. The existing architecture to detect these launches, however, may be insufficient to detect launches in Iran. Consequently, the Department of Defense should ensure that it maintains a persistent capability to detect ballistic missile launches from Iran, and if, necessary, intercept and destroy said missile launches.
Conclusion
Neither the United States, Israel, the Arab Gulf countries, nor many other countries in the Middle East want Iran to control the region. The stakes are high. Tehran’s high-profile coordinated attack against Israel in April 2024 clearly demonstrated that Iran has both the capability and the will to escalate its aggression against adversaries. A modest nuclear arsenal would only increase the Iranian threat. There is still time, however, to increase collective deterrence against Iran to curb Tehran’s aggression.
It is possible that Iran could test a nuclear device in the coming weeks or months. If it does, the President as Commander in Chief will have to decide how to respond and what to do. The U.S. does not want a war in the Middle East, but it also cannot afford to accept a nuclear-armed Iran. A diplomatic solution is almost certainly desirable but at this juncture may not be possible.
All of these decisions will confront the next President. Regardless of the outcome of the November elections, the United States must equip and empower its regional partners and allies to confront Iran, use its diplomatic and economic levers to put pressure on the Iranian regime, and—if necessary—develop and maintain the capabilities needed to destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities.
Robert Peters is Research Fellow for Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for National Security at The Heritage Foundation. Nicole Robinson is Senior Research Associate for the Middle East in the Allison Center.
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Publish date : 2024-10-01 11:02:00
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