Central Europe Drives EU Strategic Communication – For Better Or Worse ⋆ Visegrad Insight

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The Fico government has targeted anti-corruption processes and cultural figures.

Czechia’s regional elections confirmed Babiš’s support and a fractured ruling coalition.

Hungary has greatly weakened its EU position through its EUCO Presidency.

The Tusk government has investigated more PiS members but had judiciary reforms held back by Duda.

Germany again blocked eastern calls for collective defence, as Tusk-Scholz tensions continued to rise.

Ukraine has become creative in its plans but is yet to receive full support on key issues.

Donald Tusk’s Poland has become a leading voice on the EU’s foreign security policies, especially regarding transatlantic relations and regional defence through enlargement. Elections in Moldova (20 October) and the US (5 November) will dictate to what extent such policies can be implemented.

How CEE politics shapes the policies of the EU

Donald Tusk’s Poland has become a leading voice on EU foreign and security policies, especially regarding transatlantic relations and regional defence through enlargement.

Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski has repeatedly called for more investment in European security as the US reallocates resources to the Indo-Pacific. ‘Europe has no other choice but [to] get ready for a change. America will keep an eye close on Asia,’ Sikorski wrote before a foreign affairs council on 22 July. Yet both sides also need to ‘strengthen the transatlantic relations through strategic communication about the EU in the US,’ according to Sikorski’s non-paper, making clear to Americans that Europe is still their most important and reliable partner and that Ukraine is a necessary investment.

Warsaw is well placed to lead these changing relations since it remains a primary US defence partner. In August, Poland secured a €13 billion deal for US Apache attack helicopters. Where NATO’s 2014 investment pledge requires allies to devote 20% of annual defence spending to major new equipment, Poland is set to spend 51% this year.

Prime Minister Tusk also promised to ‘accelerate’ Moldova’s accession process during his visit to Chișinǎu on 15 September, declaring that ‘I will do everything possible so that Europe…supports you.’ Such promises come ahead of Poland’s European Council (EUCO) Presidency from January 2025, and Tusk made sure to criticise the current Hungarian presidency (ostensibly also focused on enlargement): ‘[W]e expect that the current Hungarian presidency will not be sufficiently energetic in terms of EU enlargement. That means there will be a larger responsibility on Poland to make up for lost time.’

Elections in Moldova (20 October) and the US (5 November) will dictate to what extent such policies can be implemented. Sikorski has said that the EU must take responsibility for its own security whoever wins the US elections, yet Trump continues to raise concerns around US support for Ukrainian, and so EU, defence – especially by echoing Viktor Orbán ‘peace’ narratives.

During the presidential debate on 12 September, Trump said ‘I want the war to stop. I want to save lives,’ before repeating the claim that Vladimir Putin would have never invaded Ukraine had he been in the White House – and labelling Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán as ‘one of the most respected men’. Kamala Harris highlighted that such appeasement is no route to real peace, as well as ‘the importance of the greatest military alliance the world has ever known, which is NATO.’

US-sanctioned, pro-Russian Moldovan oligarch Igor Shor, who masterminds the campaigns behind the country’s pro-Russian parties, would have Chișinǎu ‘restore relations with Russia’, join the BRICS alliance, ‘reinstate the status of the Russian language’ and secure ‘cheap gas and affordable energy’.

Russian interference threatens to undermine both nations’ democratic processesand so empower such actors that are to varying degrees sympathetic to pro-Russian narratives.

The US indicted two Russian citizens and seized more than 30 domains related to a campaign to influence the American election on 5 September. Meta has also blocked several Russian state media operators, including the RT television channel, over similar allegations. The Microsoft Threat Analysis Centre reports a notable shift in Russian influence operations towards targeting the Harris-Walz campaign.

Leaked files also reveal Russian plans to influence key powers across Europe. For example, Putin’s Digital Army generated 34 million pro-Kremlin comments in just the first four months of 2024. After all, ‘[t]he outcome of [2024] campaigns will largely determine the West’s future sanctions policy towards Russia and support for Ukraine,’ the Russian report writes.

During his visit to Chișinǎu on 17 September, Sikorski deplored the ‘hurricane attack of Russian trolls, corruption and hybrid warfare’ which Moldova faces ahead of its presidential elections and EU membership referendum on 20 October – with reports that Russia will spend €100 million on interference. Those linked to Shor are also spending more on disinformation: €30,000 on Facebook in June alone, or €400,000 since Shor was sanctioned in October 2022. Shor has even offered to pay voters the equivalent of $29 if they vote against EU accession.

President Maia Sandu (Party of Action and Solidarity) currently has 26.8% support, compared to 12.7% for Renato Usatîi and 11.2% for Alexandr Stoianoglo (from the pro-Russian ‘Our Party’ and ‘Party of Socialists’ respectively), according to an iData poll from late September. Support for EU membership is at 56%among decided voters, with 34% opposed. Harris and Trump are neck-and-neck in key battleground states according to this New York Times/Siena College poll and two Fox News polls in North Carolina and Pennsylvania.

Between European Unity and Disunity

‘Robert Fico continues to consolidate power by attacking the opposition. The removal of opposition leader Michal Šimečka from the position of deputy speaker of parliament is an unprecedented move in Slovak history,’ says Eva Mihočková, a Visegrad Insight Fellow from Slovakia and Editor in Chief of Foreign Policy SFPA.

The ruling coalition has also sought to derail any legal cases against past and present members. For example, four individuals, including prosecutor Michal Šúrek, were charged with abuse of power in mid-July.  Each individual had previously worked on a corruption case codenamed ‘Purgatory,’ which implicated Prime Minister Fico, Defence Minister Robert Kaliňák, former national police chief Tibor Gašpar and others suspected of corruption and manipulating investigations.

The opposition ANO Party of billionaire, populist ex-Prime Minister Andrej Babiš won a clear victory in regional elections on 20-21 September, taking 10 of 13 regions and 292 deputies – 114 more than in 2020. The socially liberal Pirate Party suffered a major defeat, prompting party chair Ivan Bartos to resign and the party to leave the ruling coalition. Local news has speculated that Martin Kuba, governor of South Bohemia – where the ODS party of Prime Minister Petr Fiala managed to win convincingly – could replace Fiala ahead of Czechia’s national elections next Autumn. ANO is likely to win again, and Kuba could lead the ODS into a coalition with Babiš.

Péter Magyar’s Respect and Freedom (TISZA) Party is closing in on the ruling Fidesz-KDNP coalition, and Viktor Orbàn has already started rigging the 2026 elections in his favour in response. This includes boosting the importance of the Hungarian diaspora vote and redrawing the map of voting districts – meaning that traditionally liberal areas like Budapest would include fewer districts.

‘The popularity of Péter Magyar and his TISZA Party has grown further since the EP and municipal elections in June, soaking up predominantly the opposition parties’ former voters.  He successfully kept the bad conditions of healthcare and railways on the public agenda, which most Hungarians consider to be pressing issues. According to the latest Medián poll, TISZA grew close to Fidesz-KDNP, with 39% to 43% respectively, among decided voters,’ says Dorka Takácsy, a Visegrad Insight Fellow from Hungary and a researcher at the Corvinus University of Budapest.

Donald Tusk’s government has started to act on its promise to bring the Law and Justice Party (PiS) and its members to justice. The National Electoral Commission (PKW) rejected the party’s annual financial report for 2023, questioning 3.6 million złoty (€840,000) as improperly raised and spent during last year’s parliamentary elections – which could cost PiS over €10 million in funding. The Polish Supreme Audit Office (NIK) has also said the former MFA unlawfully issued over 360,000 visas for citizens of Muslim and African countries, while the Commission for the Study of Russian and Belarusian Influence is expected to announce its report in October.

Numerous scandals involving PiS members have also come to light – including former Deputy Justice Minister Marcin Romanowski, former Deputy Prime Minister Jacek Sasin, former MEP Ryszard Czarnecki, as well as businessman Michał Kuczmierowski and several others.

Nonetheless, PiS is less than 2% behind the Civic Coalition (KO), according to an IBRiS survey for Rzeczpospolita – with 31.9% and 33.5% support respectively. President Andrzej Duda has also continued to be a thorn in the side of the ruling coalition, for instance on the issue of ambassadorial choices – but especially in rule of law issues. This will likely continue until the presidential elections in May 2025.

Elsewhere: Bulgaria will hold its seventh election in three years on 20 October, after parties failed to form a coalition government; Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze has vowed to outlaw the entire opposition if his Georgian Dream Party wins, also in October elections; and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has reset his government personnel – a move that has been seen as mysterious and brief but also necessary to inspire energy ahead of a hard winter.

Collective Defence or Unilateral Action

Poland, Czechia and the Baltics have continued to spearhead security on Europe’s eastern flank. Poland in particular has led on spending, with plans for the 2025 state budget to dedicate 4.7% of GDP to defence – or 186 billion złoty. Interior Minister Tomasz Siemoniak also announced a ‘revolutionary project’ with ‘multi-billion costs’ to reform Poland’s civil protection system in early August. Poland now has NATO’s third-largest military, and the alliance’s largest in Europe, with 216,100 personnel according to NATO estimates for 2024.

The same countries have increased calls for a collective approach to European security, especially with regards to the bloc’s border with Russia and Belarus. A letter penned to the Chairman of the EU in June, by the prime ministers of Poland and the Baltics, says that Belarus’ use of illegal immigration as a form of hybrid warfare demands ‘dedicated EU action…both politically and financially.’

Tensions on the Polish-Belarusian border peaked when a Polish border guard was killed in July, prompting the so-called ‘Safe Podlasie’ operation – involving 17,000 Polish military personnel. A 64% drop in illegal border crossings has been attributed to exclusion zones and such new regulations.

Romania, Poland and Latvia have also called on NATO allies to develop a ‘joint air defence’, following a meeting of the Bucharest Nine (B9) in September and numerous instances of Russian drones entering the alliance’s airspace. Ironically, Belarus has also suffered from Russian combat UAVs crashing near its border with Ukraine – humiliating incidents for a close friend of the Kremlin.

‘After two years in which the country preferred to help Ukraine under the radar, Romania’s donation of a Patriot missile system to Ukraine signalled a change in strategy. Romania will continue to offer logistical support to Ukraine, and was one of the countries calling for a stronger NATO response to Russian drone incursions in NATO airspace.’

‘While the Romanian government has signed several military agreements with the US, however, the lack of a sense of urgency is seen in the continuous delay of new defence laws that would be needed to strike downunmanned aerial dronesand prepare large numbers of reservists during peacetime,’ says Adrian Mihaltianu, a Visegrad Insight Fellow from Romania and Editorial Director at PressOne.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Donald Tusk signed a security agreement on 8 July, during the Ukrainian president’s visit to Warsaw. Zelenskyy labelled the agreement an ‘unprecedented document’ for including plans to form and train a new volunteer Ukrainian military unit on Polish territory – which tens of thousands have reportedly already joined.

Czechia also launched a second project to purchase ammunition for Ukraine, called ‘Initiative-2025,’ including five arms companies. Foreign minister Jan Lipavský has announced, however, that the original aim to supply 800,000 shells by the end of 2024 could fall short by more than a third unless countries donate more.

‘After an intense period of ramping up production and repair services, due to Ukrainian demand for old Soviet or Russian-based weapons designs, there is a growing sense that defence companies from Central Europe need to look more to the future. Companies need to adapt and pair with Western giants as a part of the broader European trend of necessary consolidation. This process seems much more straightforward in Czechia, where most defence companies are privately owned, than in Poland, where the majority is in state hands,’ explains Martin Ehl, a Visegrad Insight Fellow from Czechia and Chief Analyst at Hospodářské Noviny.

NATO’s incoming secretary-general Mark Rutte and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz have criticised this collective approach to security and joint EU defence funding in particular. Tensions have risen between Scholz and Tusk as a result, with the latter increasingly exasperated with his German counterpart for refusing to agree to defence cooperation. Among other alarmed neighbours, Tusk also called Germany’s decision to impose new border controls from 16 September ‘unacceptable’ and against the spirit of European Schengen.

‘Donald Tusk’s Polish government has not approached Berlin on many contentious issues – as many observers had expected. World War II reparations, aid to Ukraine, migration and energy transformation: Warsaw and Berlin are far apart. Warsaw is becoming increasingly assertive, while Berlin appears to be shaken both internally and by the global situation,’ writes Philipp Fritz, a Visegrad Insight Fellow from Germany and foreign correspondent for WELT.

Enlarged EU or the Ivory-Tower

In addition to Polish efforts, many Western countries have shown increased support for Moldova’s EU path. The Baltic Presidents issued a joint declaration of support after visiting Chișinǎu on 26 August for Moldova’s Independence Day. Foreign Ministers from Poland, Romania, France, Germany and the Netherlands then met at a support forum in Moldova in mid-September, during which it was announced that Western bodies would send €380 million in aid in the coming month.

Serbia signed a cooperation agreement with the EU on the supply of critical raw materials on 17 July – after it was announced that a controversial Rio Tinto lithium mining project would go ahead in the country – and agreed a €2.7 billion deal to buy 12 French-made fighter jets on 29 August. French and Germanofficials have said both moves will bring Serbia closer to the EU, but others fear the EU could become too lenient with Serbia’s violation of democracy and rule of law.

Such concerns come amid rising tensions between Serbia and Kosovo.  After back-and-forth provocations, leaders from both countries refused to attend a trilateral meeting with EU negotiators in mid-September, before refusing to speak at a working lunch with European Commission (EC) Chief Ursula von der Leyen on 19 September. Serbian President Aleksandr Vučić blamed the ‘brutal assault on the Serb population primarily in northern Kosovo as well as what the international community failed to do.’ Serbia aligned with 47% of EU foreign policy declarations from January to June 2024, while Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia achieved 100% alignment.

Bilateral disputes also emerged between the new North Macedonian government and its neighbours, especially Bulgaria and Greece – with issues ranging from Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski repeatedly calling his nation ‘Macedonia’ to accusations of disrespect during official visits.

Poland has continued its support for Ukrainian integration – for instance by developing joint railroad communication – but tensions have arisen around historical issues. Difficult talks took place between Sikorski and Zelenskyy in mid-September, as the former sought to secure exhumation for Polish victims of the Volhynian Tragedy – a request which was reportedly not accepted and met by a list of Ukrainian demands in turn. This followed controversial comments made by former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba in relation to Operation Vistula. Both issues have long been used by Russian disinformers to drive a wedge between Kyiv and Warsaw.

Similarly, western allies have continued support for Ukraine while being hesitant to accelerate its accession process. Von der Leyen announced a €35 billion loan during her visit to Kyiv on 20 September, as the European Commission looks to convince the US to chip into a total €50 billion loan. At the Washington Summit, NATO allies called out China for its role as a ‘decisive enabler’ of Russia’s war. However, the summit communiqué failed to offer a timeline towards membership.

Ukraine has looked to creative methods to exert pressure on Russia – and put in motion its so-called Victory Plan. Kuleba became the first Ukrainian official to visit Beijing since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, while Kyiv also hosted Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. On the frontlines, the Kremlin was caught off guard on 6 August when thousands of Ukrainian troops were deployed in a cross-border offensive in the Kursk region. Both methods could give Kyiv bargaining chips in any future talks.

‘Zelenskyy is acutely aware of the increasing toll the Russia-Ukraine war is taking on his country. Russia will never negotiate in good faith, however, so Zelenskyy’s Victory Plan aims to make the war more costly for Russia than pursuing peace. It also involves enhancing Ukraine’s military capacity and allowing deeper strikes into Russian territory, a proposal met with resistance in Washington due to escalation fears,’ explains Roch Dunin-Wąsowicz, a Visegrad Insight Fellow from the UK and Lecturer in Sociology at UCL.

Hungarian actions have undermined not just Ukrainian plans, but wider European security. At the start of Hungary’s EUCO Presidency, Orbán went on a self-acclaimed ‘world peace mission’ – a sequence of unmandated visits to Moscow, Beijing and Mar-a-Lago. Budapest then introduced a National Card that allows Russian and Belarusian ‘guest workers’ to enter Hungary without usual security screening – note that Hungary has also threatened to send migrants to Brussels in retaliation for being fined €1 million a day by the ECJ for its policy toward asylum seekers. Most recently, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry has been accused of overseeing an operation to smuggle military-grade equipment from America to Russia.

EU members have become increasingly exasperated with Orbán, to the point of boycotting most meetings held in Budapest – including the foreign affairs summit on 28-29 August, and potentially the summit focused on the Western Balkans to be held from 7-8 November.

‘Hungary has manoeuvred itself onto the sidelines in Europe, despite holding the EUCO Presidency. Most other governments no longer see the country as a partner but as an advocate of Russian interests. There has never been so little trust in Budapest as there is now in Western capitals,’ writes Philipp Fritz.

This has not stopped Orbán successfully pulling (and in some cases funding) pro-Russian parties into the new Patriots for Europe grouping, which includes the Hungarian Fidesz, Czech ‘ANO,’ French ‘National Rally,’ Italian ‘League,’ Austrian ‘FPÖ,’ Portuguese ‘Chega,’ Dutch ‘PVV,’ Spanish ‘VOX,’ Belgian ‘Vlaams Belang’ and Danish ‘People’s Party.’

Said grouping has been placed under a cordon sanitaire, however, and Hungarian commissioner Olivér Várhelyi was only given the health and animal welfare portfolio on 17 September. Several CEE commissioners received significant portfolios, including Kaja Kallas (Estonia, High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy); Piotr Serafin (Poland, Budget, Anti-fraud, Public Administrations); Józef Síkela (Czechia, International Partnerships); Andrius Kubilius (Lithuania, Defence); and Marta Kos (Slovenia, Enlargement) – but it remains to be seen whether or not Von der Leyen will listen to countries from the eastern flank and their geopolitical vantage point. 

After severe flooding in the region,Poland showed remarkable convening power by hosting state heads from Czechia, Slovakia and Austria at an emergency meeting in Wrocław, as well as Von der Leyen – who announced €10 billion in aid for urgent repairs. Orbán was a notable absentee, depriving Hungarians of relief aid, both because his anti-EU rhetoric put him at odds with EU initiatives, and because rule of law issues had already drained funds available to Hungary.

‘Particularly in the initial period of the floods, there was a lack of cooperation procedures between central and local government, and residents complained of a lack of reliable information. This is a picture of weak procedures, which can also have a negative impact in the event of even more serious crises. An opportunity is the draft law on civil protection and defence that is currently underway in the Polish parliament,’ says Krzysztof Izdebski, a Visegrad Insight Fellow from Poland and Board Member at the Stefan Batory Foundation.

Between Dependence and Interdependence

Russian attacks on Ukraine’s power grid have led to significant shortages, as the country continues to ‘prepare for the winter period and develop alternative generation sources,’ says Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal. Ukraine has been importing electricity from the EU to fill the gap, and Von der Leyen announced during her visit to Kyiv that the CHP thermal power plant in Lithuania will be transferred to Ukraine – adding to the €2 billion EU countries have provided in energy support.

Ukrainian drones have also proven highly effective in striking equipment warehouses and energy stores. The Kommersant newspaper says that Russian oil refineries are paying 70 times more than in 2023 for premiums for damage from air attacks.

‘The less regulated tech sector in Ukraine has enabled a surge in AI-driven innovation, particularly in drone warfare. AI-powered drones can now autonomously identify targets, navigate terrain and carry out strikes, significantly enhancing Ukraine’s battlefield capabilities. Ukraine has thus positioned itself as a leader in autonomous military technology,’ says Roch Dunin-Wąsowicz, a Visegrad Insight Fellow from the UK and Lecturer in Sociology at the University College London.

Hungary and Slovakia requested EC intervention after Ukrainian sanctions halted transit of Russian Lukoil to both countries – and threatened to use a settlement mechanism should the EC decide not to help. The latter decided not to intervene, however, on the grounds that neither Hungary nor Slovakia has made any attempt to drop its Russian energy habits, despite receiving temporary exemptions from EU energy sanctions imposed on Russia more than two years ago.

Instead, Czech energy and media oligarch Daniel Křetínský confirmed his intention to buy a majority stake in Slovenské Elektrárne, which produces 70% of all electricity in Slovakia. The state retains a 34% blocking stake, but the deal would increase Křetínský’s EPH stake to 66% and mark another rise in EPH’s position in Slovakia under Fico-led cabinets.

It was also revealed thatBudapest took a €1 billion loan from China in April, with plans to make such financing more widespread in the future. The three-year loan, which Budapest did not announce publicly, is aimed at financing infrastructure, transport and energy projects. For example, the steelworks factory in Dunaújváros was saved from bankruptcy thanks to another Chinese loan worth €1.3 billion, which will reportedly be spent on building a new plant with more modern technology.

Such cooperation comes despite EU plans to introduce regulation on Chinese trade, with a vote scheduled for 4 October on whether or not to introduce duties of up to 36.3%, on top of the current 10% tariff, on EVs imported from China from November. Countries with strong automotive links such as Hungary, Slovakia and Germany have said they will oppose tariffs – BYD, the world’s largest EV maker by sales, has one plant in Hungary and is likely to build a second. France and Poland have led calls for a strong stance on China.

‘Central and Eastern European countries have increasingly voiced their expectation that political goodwill towards Taiwan translates into tangible economic benefits, preferably in the high-tech sector. This is partly motivated by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s (TSMC) decision to establish its first European plant in Dresden, Germany. Amid the EU’s push for technological sovereignty, CEE countries seek to firmly embed themselves in chip supply chains and view Taiwan as a critical partner in this endeavour,’ writes Marcin Jerzewski 葉皓勤, a Visegrad Insight Fellow from Poland Head of the Taiwan Office of the European Values Center for Security Policy.

In September, Poland was one of six EU member states to open a national pavilion at SEMICON 2024, a major semiconductor trade show hosted in Taipei. The Polish-Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry was also established in recent months – a key step towards bottom-up economic exchanges between both sides. Czechia is also slated to benefit from pilot projects. In July, foreign minister Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) announced that Taipei was going to establish new industrial zones overseas and the Ústecký Region has been scouted in this context. 

‘Taiwan can thus facilitate the formation of a Central European chip triangle – with vertices at Germany’s Saxonia, Czechia’s Ústecký Region and Poland’s Lower Silesia,’ writes Marcin Jerzewski 葉皓勤.

Czechia chose the Korean company KHNP to build two new blocks at the Dukovany power plant – after which unsuccessful contenders, especially French EDF, immediately started to undermine the Czech government’s decision. Czech energy company CEZ also announced a deal to buy part of the British Rolls-Royce Small Modular Reactors producer.

‘There is a heavy fight for new projects of ‘small’ and ‘big’ reactors in Europe, in which central Europe now plays an important role as a testing ground – Koreans could enter the new European market via Czechia, and small reactors could get the first European commercial contracts here in the region as well,’ says Martin Ehl.

Czech Minister of Industry and Trade Jozef Síkela accused Germany of stoking up gas meant for Czechia for its own use, arguing that the exit capacity of a pipeline connection near the Czech border should be reduced to 14.5 GWh, down on the current 69 GWh. Síkela warned that a reduced inflow of gas from the west could lead to another spike in the use of Russian gas in Czechia and other countries in CEE.

Germany also drew public criticism from Poland for failing to cut its dependence on Russian gas – and for putting its security and energy partners in a difficult position – in the wake ofnew Nord Stream revelations. It was initially reported that Zelenskyy approved a plan to sabotage the pipelines and that a suspect involved managed to flee across the Polish-Ukrainian border. German intelligence has since started investigating the possibility of a ‘false flag operation’ designed to obscure Russia’s role, however, as well as consequent Kremlin narratives targeting Kyiv and Warsaw.

The EC had approved Polish government plans to grant over €1.7 billion in financial aid for a €4.15 billion Intel semiconductor plant – expected to be one of the country’s biggest ever foreign investment deals and create around 2,000 jobs – but Intel has suspended its key investments in Europe for two years, including the construction of this historic factory in Poland.

Prosperity for All or the Few

On 26 July, the EU Council started proceedings against eight EU countries, including Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, for growing deficits in their domestic budgets. Warsaw will not make a U-turn on its defence spending, however. Poland also only has issues with deficits, not debt, which reduces the scale of action required. ‘There will be no question of any cuts thanks to economic growth budget revenues,’ said Minister of Finance Andrzej Domański.

Brussels is also set to push EU member states towards an overhaul of its €1.2 trillion common budget, which would tie payments to economic reforms rather than automatically compensating poorer countries. One of the most contentious changes will be to revamp rules for so-called cohesion funds, which distribute tens of billions of euros a year to close the economic gap between richer and poorer countries. The latter are likely to oppose any moves that they see as potentially limiting their payouts – and Hungary, Slovakia and the Baltic states are the top five net recipients of cohesion funds.

Mario Draghi’s long-awaited report was released in early September, calling on the bloc to better coordinate industrial policy and invest as much as €800 billion per year, or 5% of GDP – far higher than the 1-2% of GDP that was required in the Marshall Plan for rebuilding Europe after World War Two. Von der Leyen’s decision to give the budget portfolio to Piotr Serafin gives Poland a chance to lead reforms – whilst also plunging Warsaw into aforementioned debates across Europe.

In turn, giving the Trade and Economic Security, Interinstitutional Relations and Transparency portfolios to Maroš Šefčovič could backfire given the Slovak government is opposed to many economic security measures, especially EV tariffs on China – which top the trade agenda.

Plurality of Sources

Publishers and other platforms that aim to connect with the public are facing increasing challenges in an information environment that is undergoing substantial changes, according to the Reuters Digital New Report 2024. This explores Poland’s polarised media post-2023 elections, Slovakia’s political crisis post Fico’s return, continued pressure on Hungarian media and a turbulent year for Czech media.

V4 nations also face increasing hybrid warfare from Russia. The annual report of the Czech National Centre Against Organised Crime warns against pro-Russian information campaigns in the public sphere – especially those which aim to stop aid to Ukraine. Hundreds of schools across Czechia and Slovakia received bomb threats in early September, only months after a similar wave of threats, while Polish security services have also had to neutralise sabotage operations – for example on 9 September, when ‘Belarusian and Russian foreign services [tried] to extort information, to blackmail individuals and institutions and to wage a de facto cyberwar,’ deputy Prime Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski explained.

In contrast,‘the Hungarian government has started to use its Sovereignty Protection Office against CSOs, Transparency International Hungary and the investigative portal Átlátszó. A background institute was also established for the Office, the Sovereignty Protection Research Institute, headed by a former Communist state agent. Earlier, the head of the Office had declared the probing of potential Russian influence to be of no priority. Based on their recent report, in which they label ‘pro-war’ those who voice different opinions from government propaganda, it is anticipated that the Institute and the Office are going to carry out further smear campaigns against independent and critical editorials, organisations and experts,’ warns Dorka Takácsy.

In turn, Orbán is reportedly blaming his propagandists for not stopping TISZA’s rise and failing to reach voters during the European Parliamentary elections. For more on Hungarian disinformation in 2024, read this Political Capital report.

Leaders of the Renew group called on the EC to take ‘every possible immediate action’ against the spread of disinformation on X – including Elon Musk’s own comments about an impending European ‘civil war’ – which ‘play a role in driving political violence in Europe.’ This came eight months into an EC investigation as to whether X is in breach of the EU’s Digital Services Act, and followed news that Musk would be summoned to an inquisition over X’s role in UK race riots.

In fact, the EU scored several wins against big tech. TikTok opted not to get into a major battle with the EU and backed down on plans to introduce a feature that would reward users for more screen time – while the ECJ’s crushing of challenges from Apple (on a €13 billion back-tax bill) and Google meant Margrethe Vestager left her role as competition commissioner on a high. This in turn motivated other cases, including one against META in Poland by another tech billionaire, aimed at removing fake and derogatory posts about his wife.

A group of about 350 local news organisations launched a joint, one-day campaign against Polish politicians on 4 July as they sought to amend a draft law to set rules that would allow them to better negotiate compensation with Big Tech giants.

State Capture or Independence

Slovakia has made no progress on improving the rule of law according to the EC’s annual Rule of Law Report. Rather, it has been damaged by the Smer-led cabinet’s criminal code overhaul, abolition of the Special Prosecutor’s Office and attacks on the independence of journalists and judges.

As expected, Peter Pellegrini has done little to prevent Fico’s changes. For instance, the President readily appointed Pavol Gašpar as the new director of the Slovak Information Service (SIS) – the son of the well-known, accused Smer MP and ex-police chief Tibor Gašpar. Not long after, reports emerged that the SIS may have bought the same Israeli Pegasus surveillance system infamously used by the Law and Justice Party in Poland. The ruling coalition has also removed opposition MP Mária Kolíková as chairwoman overseeing the (SIS) and other state services.

National police chief Ľubomír Solák and Interior Minister Matúš Šutaj Eštok officially confirmed changes to the Slovak police force from 1 September. The re-organisation is seen by many as another attempt to remove inconvenient officers and weaken special units, especially those targeting high-profile figures involved in public finance corruption. A video obtained by Denník N, however, revealed that surveillance of NAKA investigators may have been illegal – greatly undermining Fico, who long used the wiretaps to smear NAKA officers.

In turn, changes to the criminal code are already taking effect. Dušan Kováčik, a former special prosecutor and important figure for Fico, was temporarily released from prison on 7 August – as per a new provision which allows a convict to be released in some situations without waiting for the Supreme Court. A prosecutor similarly halted criminal proceedings against interim Speaker of Parliament and Hlas member Peter Žiga, citing the expiration of the old statute of limitation.

The EC has warned Slovakia that it will take immediate legal action if the government pushes ahead with a law requiring NGOs that receive funding from abroad to label themselves ‘organisations with foreign support.’ ‘If you follow the Hungarian example…we will launch an infringement procedure immediately, because already we have the decision of the court on the table,’ explained EC VP Vera Jourova on 24 July.

The EC also strongly condemned the poor state of the rule of law in Hungary, where ‘the freedom of expression of judges remains under pressure and smear campaigns against judges continue in the media.’  All ‘threats to media pluralism highlighted in previous Rule of Law Reports have remained unaddressed.’

‘By far one of the highlights of the last quarter was the nearly six-hour meeting between Tusk and representatives of the legal community. I cannot recall the Prime Minister of Poland devoting so much time and attention to a conversation about the rule of law in the last decade. Remarkably, all participants left the meeting with a sense of triumph. This only confirms Donald Tusk’s political talent. It does not change the fact, however, that we will have to wait at least until the presidential elections for meaningful action – for example, a solution to the problem of neo-judges,’says Jarosław Gwizdak, a Visegrad Insight Fellow from Poland and Former judge and Court President in Katowice.

Justice Minister Adam Bodnar joined Tusk to set out a direction for the restoration of the rule of law in mid-September, outlining new regulations for judges who were appointed after 2018 – so-called ‘neo-judges.’ The Presidential office was quick to declare the bill as unconstitutional, to which Tusk responded by saying that ‘There is no doubt who is largely responsible for this extraordinary mess…[Andrzej Duda] started his tenure by devastating Poland’s legal system and constitutional system. He refuses to work with the Polish government to repair the justice system and rebuild the rule of law.’

‘It is also worth mentioning the visit of a delegation from the Venice Commission, which discussed the draft law on the separation of the Prosecutor General from the Minister of Justice. Cooperation with international expert bodies should be a benchmark for the new government, not only in its efforts to restore the rule of law,’ says Jarosław Gwizdak

Polarisation or Cohesion

Tens of thousands protested on the streets of Bratislava throughout August to demand the resignation of Culture Minister Martina Šimkovičová, after her purge of the directors of the Slovak National Theatre and National Gallery in early August. On 19 September, the Open Culture! initiative organised protests in fourteen towns across the country.

‘These protests by workers in the cultural sector across Slovakia are the most significant expression of public dissatisfaction with the policies of Robert Fico’s government,’ says Eva Mihočková.

Women’s rights groups also protested in Warsaw on 23 July after a slim majority rejected a bill that would have eased Poland’s anti-abortion law – with 218 lawmakers voting against, 215 for and two abstentions.

Far-right forces sought to amplify and weaponise gender controversies at the Olympics, following the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) decision to allow Algerian fighter Imane Khelif and Taipei fighter Lin Yu-ting to compete at the Paris games – both were disqualified from last year’s world championships by the International Boxing Association (IBA) for failing to meet gender eligibility criteria. A crucial detail is that the IBA is led by Russian Umar Kremlev, an associate of Vladimir Putin who moved much of the IBA’s operations to Russia after he took over in late 2020 – a connection that led to the IBA’s permanent ban from the Olympics.

Protests erupted in Sofia on 7 August after the Bulgarian parliament adopted a bill banning the teaching of ‘non-traditional sexual orientation’ and alternative gender identities in schools. The bill, proposed by a far-right pro-Russian party and unexpectedly supported by GERB (EPP) and the liberal Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Renew), mirrors similar laws in Russia, Hungary and Georgia.

Nearly a third of Bulgarians are inclined towards authoritarian governance, likely because of political instability following repeated, inconclusive elections – according to a recent survey by the Alfa Research Foundation in Sofia.

Thousands demonstrated across Serbia on 29 July to protest the Rio Tinto lithium mining project, after its renewal sparked criticism from environmental and opposition groups.

CEE think tanks quarterly review

As the US re-allocates resources to the Indo-Pacific, amid growing Chinese aggression in the Taiwan Strait, CEE research focuses increasingly on changing transatlantic security relations. Reports highlighted the need for the EU to re-evaluate its global standing accordingly, build up its defence – led by CEE countries like Poland and Czechia – and so make Europe’s security role meaningful again.

It was also suggested that European countries should now add practical steps towards NATO integration to complex, bilateral security agreements with Ukraine – and so shape the future of the alliance. Reports highlighted the role Central Europe is already playing amid Ukrainian reconstruction and energy crises, as well as the keen eye being kept on Ukraine’s progress and challenges regarding corruption and state reform.

The research looked at how to better pressure Russia – see the surprise and creativity of Ukraine’s Kursk incursion – and what courses of action to avoid. This came as the Kremlin continued its nuclear sabre-rattling and in various ways reaffirmed its clear intention to annihilate Ukraine.

Reports also analysed Russian information and psychological warfare in Europe and how pro-Russian narratives have helped and been adopted by populist governments. This mutual relationship was on display during EP elections in Hungary, but disinformation has been rife throughout the V4, including Poland – as it becomes a profitable industry. Research explored Europe’s changing media landscape – in part down to generative AI – and the great importance of CSOs as a result.

Research on foreign information manipulation and interference took place through the lens of upcoming elections, especially elections in the US – and whether the EU is prepared for their impact – and Moldova. CEE reports highlighted the importance of strong strategic communication on the part of the EU in order to defend both democratic elections’ integrity.

Reports also called for democratic resilience against the PRC and recognised automotive geopolitics as a key battleground. Central Europe again emerged as an important player therein, in its potential to lead on EU-Central Asia Cooperation, innovation-driven growth and competitiveness.

As geopolitical competitiveness takes centre stage in the new EU Commission, research explored EU preparations for enlargement – led by Central Europe – and its future impact. This included increasing reports on the Western Balkans and how to break various deadlocks in the region, as well collective solutions to kleptocracy. The focus was on Moldova, Serbia and Kosovo in particular.

Authors:

Staś Kaleta and Wojciech Przybylski

Contributors
Team: Galan Dall, Katarzyna Górska, Magda Jakubowska, Tomasz Kasprowicz, Anna Kuczyńska, Natalia Kurpiewska, Jessica Moss, Magdalena Przedmojska, Albin Sybera, Luca Soltész.

Fellows:

Radu Albu-Comanescu (Romania), Merili Arjakas (Estonia), Alina Bârgăoanu (Romania), Bohdan Bernatskyi (Ukraine), Marysia Ciupka (Poland), Spasimir Domaradzki (Poland/Bulgaria), Martin Ehl (Czechia), Artur Nowak-Far (Poland), Jan Farfał (Poland), Oksana Forostyna (Ukraine), Philipp Fritz (Germany), Ognyan Georgiev (Bulgaria), Marzenna Guz-Vetter (Poland), Jarosław Gwizdak (Poland), Pavel Havlicek (Czechia), Alina Inayeh (Romania), Ruslanas Iržikevičius (Lithuania), Krzysztof Izdebski (Poland), Staś Kaleta (United Kingdom), Matej Kandrík (Slovakia), Christine Karelska (Ukraine), Aliaksei Kazharski (Belarus/Slovakia), Viktoryia Kolchyna (Belarus), Ádám Kolozsi (Hungary),  Filip Konopczyński (Poland), Oleksandr Kostryba (Ukraine), Oleksandr Kraiev (Ukraine),  Adam Leszczyński (Poland), Paweł Marczewski (Poland), Michał Matlak (Poland), Asya Metodieva (Bulgaria), Adrian Mihaltianu (Romania), Eva Mihočková (Slovakia), Malina Mindrutescu (Romania),  Marta Musidłowska (Poland), Mastura Lashkarbekova (Tajikistan/Poland), Iván László Nagy (Hungary), Marco Nemeth (Slovakia), Valeriia Novak (Ukraine), Vitaly Portnikov (Ukraine),  Matej Šimalčík (Slovakia), Jiří Schneider (Czechia), Sandra Sirvydyte (Lithuania), Sigita Struberga (Latvia), Zsuzsanna Szabó (Hungary), Dorka Takacsy (Hungary), Bartosz Wieliński (Poland), Volodymyr Yermolenko (Ukraine), Marcin Zaborowski (Poland) and Edit Zgut-Przybylska (Hungary).

   ______________________________________________________

APPENDIX

List of relevant think tank reports

Association for International Affairs (AMO)

‘Russia 2030 Futures: The View from Central and Eastern Europe,’ by Pavel Havlíček and Adam Balcer

‘Having Our Cake and Eating It Too? European Union and Czechia Getting Ready for Enlargement,’ by Pavlína Janebová and Vendula Kazlauskas

‘Impact of the Future Enlargement(s) on Czechia, Poland and Central Europe,’ by Adam Balcer and Pavel Havlíček

‘The Czech and EU Approach to Ukraine’s Reconstruction: Struggling with Sustainability,’ by Pavel Havlíček, Michal Lebduška and Tereza Wildová

Batory Foundation

‘Ten Years of Battle Against Corruption: Successes and Challenges Ahead of Ukraine,’ by Andrij Szwadczak, Andrij Tkaczuk, Anna Kuc, Kateryna Ryżenko, Natalia Siczewluk and Paweł Demczuk

https://www.batory.org.pl/publikacja/dziesiec-lat-walki-z-korupcja-sukcesy-i-wyzwania-stojace-przed-ukraina/

‘Ukraine: Realism and Hopes,’ by Edwin Bendyk

https://www.batory.org.pl/publikacja/ukraina-realizm-i-nadzieja/

‘Discussion: The State of Local Democracy’

https://www.batory.org.pl/publikacja/stan-demokracji-lokalnej-dyskusja/

‘Final Report: The Image of 2024 European Parliamentary Election Campaigns on Social Media,’ by Aleksander Winciorek, Krzysztof Izdebski, Magdalena Rudź and Robert Woźniak

https://www.batory.org.pl/publikacja/obraz-kampanii-wyborczej-do-parlamentu-europejskiego-2024-w-mediach-spolecznosciowych-raport-koncowy/

‘Rule of Law Report: A Notable Tool That Needs Fine-Tuning for Better Impact on Rule of Law in Europe’

https://www.batory.org.pl/publikacja/rule-of-law-report-a-notable-tool-that-needs-fine-tuning-for-better-impact-on-rule-of-law-in-europe-recommendations-from-civil-society-organisations/

Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW)

‘New Horizon: Implications for Poland’s Security of NATO’s approach to the Indo-Pacific,’ by Robert Pszczel, Jakub Jakóbowski and Michał Bogusz.

https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-report/2024-08-01/new-horizon

Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)

‘The Global Impact of the 2024 US Presidential Election’

https://features.csis.org/2024-us-election-global-impact/

‘The Russia-Ukraine War: A Study in Analytic Failure,’ by Eliot A. Cohen and Phillips O’Brien

https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-ukraine-war-study-analytic-failure

‘Power Plays: Europe’s Response to the Energy Crisis,’ by Max Bergmann, Cy McGeady, Otto Svendsen, Mathias Zacarias and Ignacio Urbasos

https://www.csis.org/analysis/power-plays

‘Removing Bottlenecks for the Private Sector: Ukraine’s Current State of Reforms,’ by Romina Bandura, Daria Figlus, and Ilya Timtchenko.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/removing-bottlenecks-private-sector

‘Six Days in October: Russia’s Dirty Bomb Signaling and the Return of Nuclear Crises,’ by Lachlan MacKenzie

‘Europe’s Security Role in the Indo-Pacific: Making It Meaningful,’ by Max Bergmann and Christopher B. Johnstone

https://www.csis.org/analysis/europes-security-role-indo-pacific-making-it-meaningful

‘Crossing Thresholds: Ukrainian Resistance to Russian Occupation,’ by Jade McGlynn

https://www.csis.org/analysis/crossing-thresholds-ukrainian-resistance-russian-occupation

Center for the Study of Democracy

‘Mind the Trap: Breaking the Anticorruption Deadlock in the Western Balkans,’ by Boyko Todorov, Dr. Alexander Gerganov and Daniela Mineva

https://csd.eu/publications/publication/mind-the-trap-breaking-the-anticorruption-deadlock-in-the-western-balkans/

‘Sanctions Hypocrisy,’ by Martin Vladimirov, Isaac Levi, Vaibhav Raghunandan, Meri Pukarinen and Tsvetomir Nikolov

https://csd.eu/publications/publication/sanctions-hypocrisy/

‘At the Frontier: Guidelines for Unlocking the Offshore Wind Energy Potential in Central and Eastern Europe,’ by Marius Koeppen, Martin Vladimirov, Alina Arsani, Dr. sc. Hrvoje Mikulčić and Piotr Siwiński.

https://csd.eu/publications/publication/at-the-frontier/

‘Transforming Europe’s Media Landscape’

https://csd.eu/publications/publication/transforming-europes-media-landscape/

European Council on Foreign Relations

‘Welcome to Barbieland: European sentiment in the year of wars and elections,’ by Paweł Zerka

https://ecfr.eu/publication/welcome-to-barbieland-european-sentiment-in-the-year-of-wars-and-elections/

European Economic and Social Committee

EU Social Policy actions must be better aligned to strengthening Competitiveness

https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/publications-other-work/publications/eu-social-policy-actions-must-be-better-aligned-strengthening-competitiveness

EUROPEUM

‘Czechia and NATO: Building a more capable, connected and credible European pillar,’ by Benjamin Tallis

https://www.europeum.org/en/articles/detail/6860/policy-paper-czechia-and-nato-building-a-more-capable-connected-and-credible-european-pillar

‘Managing Imperial Decline: A New EU Policy Towards Russia,’ by Hugo Blewett-Mundy

https://www.europeum.org/en/articles/detail/6852/policy-paper-managing-imperial-decline-a-new-eu-policy-towards-russia

‘Preparing for EU35+: The View from Central Europe,’ by Vladislava Gubalova

https://www.europeum.org/en/articles/detail/6820/policy-brief-preparing-for-eu35-the-view-from-central-europe

German Council on Foreign Relations

‘Mitigation, ­Adaptation, Migration: Integrating Human Mobility into International Climate Policy,’ by Mechthild Becker, Sarah Rosengaertner, Sima Bulut and Dr. Kira Vinke

https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/mitigation-adaptation-migration

‘Automotive Geopolitics: How Germany Can Respond to China,’ by Loyle Campbell and Oscar Shao

https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/automotive-geopolitics

‘Germany and Europe Can Boost Security by Reforming Capital Markets,’ by Julian Stöckle

https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/germany-and-europe-can-boost-security-reforming-capital-markets

‘Chinese Aggression in the Taiwan Strait: What Germany Can Do to Prepare,’ by Noah Barkin

https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/chinese-aggression-taiwan-strait

‘Upgrading ­EU-Central Asia Cooperation: How to Leverage Common ­Interests Amid Geopolitical Turmoil,’ by Dr. Stefan Meister and Judith Heckenthaler

https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/upgrading-eu-central-asia-cooperation  

Institute of International Relations Prague

‘Leveraging Crises: How the Russian Aggression in Ukraine Benefited the Populist Government in Hungary’s 2022 Election Campaigns,’ by Pelin Ayan Musil and Anita Tusor

https://www.iir.cz/en/leveraging-crises-how-the-russian-aggression-in-ukraine-benefited-the-populist-government-in-hungary-s-2022-election-campaigns-1

‘Civil Energy Self-Defence in the Visegrad Group,’ by  Lukáš Tichý, Jan Mazač, Dániel Muth, Matúš Mišik and Paweł Żuk

https://www.iir.cz/en/civil-energy-self-defence-in-the-visegrad-group-1

‘The 75th Anniversary of the NATO Summit and the Future of the Alliance,’ by Azriel Bermant and Shimon Stein

https://www.iir.cz/en/the-75th-anniversary-of-the-nato-summit-and-the-future-of-the-alliance-1

International and Security Affairs Centre 

‘An analysis of Serbia’s alignment with the European Union’s foreign policy declarations and measures: Semi-annual review for 2024,’ by Igor Novaković and Tanja Plavšić

https://www.isac-fund.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ISAC-Analiza-2024-ENG.pdf

International Centre for Defence and Security

‘Japan, NATO, and the Diversification of Security Partnerships,’ by Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, Bart Gaens, Takuya Matsuda and Nele Loorents

https://icds.ee/en/japan-nato-and-the-diversification-of-security-partnerships/

‘Russia’s War in Ukraine: Artificial Intelligence in Defence of Ukraine,’ by Vitaliy Goncharuk

https://icds.ee/en/russias-war-in-ukraine-artificial-intelligence-in-defence-of-ukraine/

‘Shared Goals, Different Paths, and a Complex Outcome: A Deep Dive into Ukraine’s 2024 Bilateral Security Agreements,’ by Alessandro Vitiello

https://icds.ee/en/shared-goals-different-paths-and-a-complex-outcome-a-deep-dive-into-ukraines-2024-bilateral-security-agreements/

‘Russia’s War in Ukraine: Russia’s Attempts to Undermine Mobilisation,’ by Maryna Vorotyntseva

https://icds.ee/en/russias-attempts-to-undermine-mobilisation/

‘Catching the Wind in a Net? Prospects for Russia’s Democratisation,’ by Annabel Peterson

https://icds.ee/en/catching-the-wind-in-a-net-prospects-for-russias-democratisation/

‘Ukraine’s Practical Steps towards NATO,’ by Maksym Skrypchenko

https://icds.ee/en/ukraines-practical-steps-towards-nato/

‘Russia’s War in Ukraine Series: War and Industry,’ by Stanislav Zhelikhovskyi

https://icds.ee/en/russias-war-in-ukraine-series-war-and-industry/

International Republican Institute

‘Identifying Successful Collective Action Approaches Against Kleptocracy’

https://www.iri.org/resources/identifying-successful-collective-action-approaches-against-kleptocracy/

‘Unloved but Indispensable: Political Parties in Europe,’ by Paul McCarthy, Patrick Quirk, PhD and Thibault Muzergues

https://www.iri.org/resources/unloved-but-indispensable-political-parties-in-europe/

‘Democracy in the Age of Generative AI: A White Paper,’ by Hui Hui Ooi, Aaron Spitler and Amanda Zink

https://www.iri.org/resources/democracy-in-the-age-of-generative-ai/

‘National Survey of Kosovo’

https://www.iri.org/resources/national-survey-of-kosovo-may-2024/

‘National Poll of Moldova’

https://www.iri.org/resources/national-poll-of-moldova-may-june-2024/

‘Bolstering Democratic Resilience to PRC Foreign Authoritarian Influence’

https://www.iri.org/resources/bolstering-democratic-resilience-to-prc-foreign-authoritarian-influence/

International Strategic Action Network for Security

‘There is no need to shy away from the words propaganda and counter-propaganda,’ by Andrey Kalikh

https://isans.org/analysis/reports/there-is-no-need-to-shy-away-from-the-words-propaganda-and-counter-propaganda-main-trends-in-belarusian-and-russian-propaganda-directed-at-belarus-in-the-second-quarter-of-2024.html

‘Incitement to Genocide Against Ukrainians in Russian and Belarusian Propaganda,’ by Andrey Kalikh

National Democratic Institute

‘Information Disorders in Kosovo 2023 Report’

https://www.ndi.org/publications/information-disorders-kosovo-2023-report

‘Visual History: 25 Years of NDI in Kosovo’

https://www.ndi.org/publications/visual-history-25-years-ndi-kosovo

‘Leading Organisations Supporting Democratic Elections Introduce Model Commitments to Defend Election Integrity Globally’

https://www.ndi.org/publications/leading-organizations-supporting-democratic-elections-introduce-model-commitments

‘Using Evidence-based Communications to Tackle Corruption’

https://www.ndi.org/publications/using-evidence-based-communications-tackle-corruption

‘As Costs of War Mount, Ukrainian Demands for Inclusive Democracy Remain Strong’

https://www.ndi.org/publications/costs-war-mount-ukrainian-demands-inclusive-democracy-remain-strong

Polish Economic Institute

‘Monthly Macro July 2024,’ by Jakub Rybacki, Marcin Klucznik, Sergiej Druchin, Sebastian Sajnóg and Dawid Sułkowski

https://pie.net.pl/en/monthly-macro-july-2024/

Polish Institute of International Affairs

‘Iran’s Mounting Security Challenges for Europe and the Need for a Paradigm Shift,’ by Ali Fathollah-Nejad

Political Capital

‘Disinformation Blitz During the Hungarian EP Election Campaign,’ by Richárd Demény, Ráchel Surányi and Péter Krekó

https://politicalcapital.hu/library.php?article_read=1&article_id=3414

‘Spread the Word in the Comments, Please!’

https://politicalcapital.hu/library.php?article_read=1&article_id=3429

‘Conspiracy Beliefs, Receptivity to Disinformation and Factual Relativism in Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia,’ by

https://politicalcapital.hu/library.php?article_read=1&article_id=3424

Prague Security Studies Institute

‘Disinformation Actors in the Gray Zone of Law and Ethical Business,’ by Kristína Šefčíková and Anna Dohnalová

https://www.pssi.cz/publications/136-disinformation-actors-in-the-gray-zone-of-law-and-ethical-business

Razumkov centre

‘Preparedness for Election Results,’ by Vasyl Yurchyshyn

https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2024/09/19/2024-PAKT-15-ENGL.pdf

‘Geopolitical Challenges and Geo-Economic Shifts,’ by Yuriy Yakymenko and  Vasyl Yurchyshyn

https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2024/07/22/2024-PAKT-11-ENGL-1.pdf

Ukrainian PRISM Foreign Policy Council

‘Ukraine-Japan: Through Hardships to the Stars,’ by Anastasiya Polishchuk

‘Russian Unmanned Systems: Current State, Prospects of Production and Application,’ by Yaroslav Chornogor

The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies 

‘Toward Innovation-driven Growth: Innovation Systems and Policies in EU Member States of Central Eastern Europe,’ by Alexandra Bykova, Viktrória Döme, Richard Grieveson, Francesca Guadagno, Doris Hanzl-Weiss, Nadya Heger, Niko Korpar, Sebastian Leitner, Jan Muś, Magdolna Sass, Bernd Christoph Ströhm, Andrea Szalavetz, Maryna Tverdostup and Zuzana Zavarská

https://wiiw.ac.at/toward-innovation-driven-growth-innovation-systems-and-policies-in-eu-member-states-of-central-eastern-europe-p-6998.html

‘Still in the Fast Lane? How can EU-CEE Get its Groove Back?,’ by Tomáš Slačík

https://wiiw.ac.at/still-in-the-fast-lane-how-can-eu-cee-get-its-groove-back-p-6997.html

Where are the Growth Potentials in CESEE? An Illustration of Sectors and Products Using the Product Space,’ by Francesca Guadagno, Doris Hanzl-Weiss and Robert Stehrer

https://wiiw.ac.at/where-are-the-growth-potentials-in-cesee-an-illustration-of-sectors-and-products-using-the-product-space-p-6917.html

Visegrad Insight

‘Disinformation in Poland,’ by Miles R. Maftean

Watchdog.md

‘Evaluation of Disinformation Campaigns Financed by Șor and Platon: Impact and Limited Reaction of Social Platforms,’ by Andrei Rusu, Andrei Curăraru and Valeriu Pașa

Visegrad Insight is the main Central European analysis and media platform. It generates future policy directions for Europe and transatlantic partners. Established in 2012 by the Res Publica Foundation.

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