Poland and Hungary in particular disagree bitterly on Russia, and the war in Ukraine is pushing the Visegrad Group into insignificance. New coalitions are emerging.
Four Visegrad countries, four very different leaders (from left): Robert Fico from Slovakia, Donald Tusk from Poland, Viktor Orbán from Hungary and Petr Fiala from Czechia met in Prague in February.
Ondrej Deml / Imago
For years, Western Europeans have come to expect East Central Europeans to deviate from the EU consensus on some issues, and to seek to steer the European course in a different direction. This has been particularly true of the relationship with Russia, as well of the issue of migration, on which they have sought tighter restrictions. Some of these countries have also had a close relationship with the United States and have been skeptical of the visions of European «strategic autonomy» promoted by Paris.
The unity within this circle of East Central Europeans was expressed though the Visegrad Group, made up of Poland, Hungary, Czechia and Slovakia. This coalition was founded in the 1990s, and regularly sought to reach coordinated positions at its own meetings or before EU summits in Brussels.
One inspiration for the formation of the Visegrad Group came from a speech by Czechoslovakian President Václav Havel in January 1990. In this address, he called for the region to transform itself into a «political phenomenon,» so that it could face the richer Western Europeans «not as poor failures or helpless, recently amnestied prisoners,» but rather as countries that could make a «genuine contribution.»
And indeed, it seemed over the years as if a kind of bloc had emerged that was able to articulate and at least occasionally assert the region’s specific interests against the Western Europeans, especially after these countries joined NATO and the EU.
Collapse of unity
However, there is today no longer any sign of the unity and cohesion that once existed. The heads of government and ministers of the Visegrad Group now meet only rarely, and efforts to reach shared positions before European Council meetings, for example, no longer take place.
Instead, two opposing centers have emerged in the region: Poland in northern East Central Europe and Hungary in southern East Central Europe. This division is being exacerbated by Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Even before Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Poland and Hungary had clearly developed different stances toward Moscow. But when the Russian war of aggression and conquest became the central, dominating topic, this relationship weakened further. Today, a political dissonance has joined the geopolitical clash. Since the nationalist conservative Law and Justice party lost the elections in Poland, and the liberal pro-European Donald Tusk became prime minister again in December 2023, any remaining political amity between Poland and Hungary has fallen to pieces.
Within Poland, Russia’s attack on Ukraine is seen as confirmation of what the country’s policymakers had always suspected: that Russian imperialism, which has traditionally turned its covetous gaze toward Eastern and East Central Europe, had by no means fallen gently asleep. Polish elites believe that Moscow recovered from the shock of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and built up new strength by opening up to the West. They see it as now directing this strength toward the goal of regaining control over the territories it lost after the Cold War.
Russia’s war as an existential threat
From the outset, Poland saw the war in Ukraine as a decisive test of strength that would determine the future of regional security. If Russia were to win in Ukraine, many Polish policymakers believe it would be next inclined to attack the Baltic states or Poland itself. Accordingly, Warsaw is providing Ukraine with massive support in the form of weapons and ammunition, and has taken in a considerable number of Ukrainian refugees. It has also served as a distribution hub for Western arms supplies.
In addition, Poland has begun investing even more in its own armed forces. This year, the country’s defense spending will total 4.1% of its gross domestic product, while next year it will reach 4.7%, or more than 40 billion euros.
For those who believe that massive deterrence is the best policy against Russia, Poland has long since become a paragon. An article recently appeared in Foreign Affairs, the U.S.-based foreign policy journal, arguing that Poland should take the lead in European security issues because it invests more heavily in its own security than any other European country, and is best placed to deal with Russia due to its geographical location and experience.
Meanwhile, Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has developed into the antithesis of Poland. Orbán has consistently tried to block or at least delay support for Ukraine at the EU level, and he even delayed approval of Sweden’s NATO membership as much as possible. Orbán additionally traveled to Moscow and Beijing last summer without an EU mandate, allegedly to sound out the chances of peace negotiations.
Following Robert Fico’s election victory in October 2023, Slovakia has largely closed ranks with Hungary. Czechia, on the other hand, remains one of Ukraine’s most determined supporters, alongside Poland.
Separate paths
A Visegrad summit was held in Prague in February of this year. At the subsequent news conference, Polish Prime Minister Tusk described Russian President Vladimir Putin as a war criminal and declared that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was the only reason for the ongoing war. Orbán countered, saying that exactly who was responsible for the war would be decided after the conflict was over.
Following the summit, Tusk visited Czech President Petr Pavel, a former NATO general, who is a strong supporter of Ukraine. Orbán and his Slovakian counterpart Fico in turn paid respects to Pavel’s predecessor Milos Zeman, who is known for being close to Moscow.
In a speech in July, Orbán declared that Europe’s center of power had shifted due to the war in Ukraine – away from the Berlin-Paris axis, which had become «irrelevant.» The new axis, he said, connects London, Warsaw, Kyiv, the Baltic countries and Scandinavia.
In fact, what binds these countries in Northern and Northeastern Europe together is their great determination to support Ukraine. Alongside Germany, these countries have provided the bulk of Europe’s aid to Ukraine. In terms of GDP, the Nordic and Northeastern European countries have served as Ukraine’s biggest supporters. Poland is at the center of this camp. This is where the threads come together, and not just geographically.
At the same time, the East Central European camp led by Hungary, which is critical of or even opposed to aid to Ukraine, could expand. In addition to Hungary and Slovakia, Czechia could soon join the list if populist Andrej Babis triumphs again in next fall’s parliamentary elections, and puts the country back on a more Moscow-friendly course. Many observers fear that this will be the case.
In any case, there is not much left of the Visegrad Group. The stance toward Russia has moved to the center of the regional agenda to such an extent that it is shaping the overall relationship between the states, especially that between Poland and Hungary.
Different visions of Europe
Orbán and Tusk also have completely different attitudes toward the EU. Orbán recently declared on X, the platform formerly called Twitter, that he wanted to «conquer» Brussels alongside the other right-wing populist movements. The Hungarian prime minister also maintains close ties with U.S. Republican Donald Trump, and is banking on Trump’s return to the White House.
Tusk, on the other hand, represents the mainstream of the EU, as does Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski. Tusk was president of the European Council, while Sikorski served as a member of the European Parliament. Both are committed to closer cooperation between Europeans on defense and armaments issues. Poland has also been given the key budget portfolio within the new EU Commission. For its part, Hungary has been downgraded from being responsible for EU enlargement to overseeing the issue of health and animal welfare.
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Publish date : 2024-10-14 10:14:00
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