Sabine Mengelberg
Assistant Professor of International Security Studies at the Netherlands Defence Academy
“NATO’s latest Strategic Concept, released just four months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, emphasises that arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation, and reciprocal political dialogue are key to maintaining strategic stability. For NATO, these concepts coexist alongside effective deterrence and defence. The alliance has long linked deterrence with arms control and disarmament, combining the principles of the United Nations Charter—such as the desire for peace and the commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force—with a united approach to collective defence, including the use of force when necessary.
The announcement to deploy intermediate-range missiles in Germany by 2026, which could potentially be equipped with nuclear warheads, marks the return of NATO’s Cold War strategy of balancing disarmament with deterrence to today’s unstable European geopolitical landscape. The question now is whether this traditional approach, which prompted adversaries to the negotiating table through an arms race in the 1980s, will be effective again.
There are significant differences between the past and the present. First, NATO has enlarged considerably, making it a more heterogeneous organisation. In the current European geopolitical climate, NATO is a more diverse alliance, with some members economically and politically tied to Russia and China, and sceptical about Ukraine’s potential NATO membership. Second, the external geopolitical landscape has also changed drastically. Negotiations are no longer just bilateral; NATO now faces a multipolar environment where Russia is joined by China and other BRIC nations. These actors, like NATO, are heterogeneous and often disagree on key issues, making negotiations potentially more volatile and unpredictable.
The US and Germany should carefully reconsider their approach, as today’s dynamics are far different from those of the 1980s.”
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“It is crucial that we combine the announcement of this deployment with an offer to Russia for arms control. This is an opportunity to test whether the Kremlin is even prepared to talk about long—and medium-range missiles.”
Nils Schmid
MP and German Social Democrats Group Coordinator on Foreign Policy
“For the first time since the end of World War II, we are facing a conventionally waged land war in Europe due to Russian aggression against Ukraine. Russia’s war of aggression and its systematic undermining of arms control and disarmament treaties is an attack against the carefully built European security architecture. Germany will continue to take the lead in coordinating with Allies and partners to protect security, peace and freedom in Europe.
Russia has been investing heavily in its military and modernising its nuclear capabilities throughout the last decade. By developing and fielding the 9M729/SSC-8 cruise missile, Moscow has single-handedly violated the 1987 INF Treaty. Therefore, we respond by modernising our conventional capabilities with medium—and long-range standoff weapons to deter attacks. There has long been a consensus in NATO that this gap in Europe must be closed. This has been openly discussed in the alliance for years. We ought to close that gap.
Finally, it is crucial that we combine the announcement of this deployment with an offer to Russia for arms control. This is an opportunity to test whether the Kremlin is even prepared to talk about long—and medium-range missiles. In recent years, there has been no such willingness, but we are trying it now anyway.”
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“Russia will not passively observe NATO’s development of long-range missile capabilities. What may initially appear controllable, calculated, and understandable could evolve into something expensive, frightening, and unpredictable.”
Nikita Degtyarev
Research and Engagement Assistant at Open Nuclear Network (ONN)
“The deployment was planned well in advance since the 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force in Germany was activated in 2021. This timing suggests that Russian agencies may have been considering countermeasures since then. However, it remains unclear how the limited deployment of new US capabilities will address perceived threats or strengthen US commitment to NATO and European deterrence. It is also unclear how this aligns with the European Long-Range Strike Approach initiative.
Russia will not passively observe NATO’s development of long-range missile capabilities, which it views as a strategic threat. In response to the changing security environment, Russia already changed its nuclear doctrine. Additionally, it may develop new INF missiles, some kind of ground-based version of the Zirkon system, modernise air defences, and so on—capabilities that could also be effectively used in Ukraine. Its response could be delayed and/or asymmetric.
NATO, in turn, will likely interpret any Russian actions as aggressive and will want to respond in kind, exacerbating the risk of an arms race. What may initially appear controllable, calculated, and understandable could evolve into something expensive, frightening, and unpredictable. While arms control talks are unlikely until the conflict in Ukraine is resolved, risks may be somewhat reduced by focusing on a cautious, slow and very limited deployment of new capabilities, alongside clear communication and attentiveness to signals from all sides.”
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“The primary purpose of this deployment is to improve conventional defence: to help paralyse Russia’s warfare capabilities in the event of an attack. They are not meant to enhance the US extended nuclear deterrence in Europe, and they don’t affect (nuclear) strategic stability.”
Heinrich Brauss
Former NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning
“The deployment of US intermediate-range missiles in Germany will contribute to deterring possible future Russian aggression and thus prevent war. It is important to realise that these missiles are exclusively conventional systems. They are not meant to enhance the US extended nuclear deterrence in Europe, as some commentators erroneously seem to believe. They don’t affect (nuclear) strategic stability either. Rather, they are to improve conventional defence. Their primary purpose is to help paralyse Russia’s warfare capabilities in the event of an attack, more so as Moscow’s brutal war against Ukraine shows the vital importance of air and missile defence. This capability is one of the biggest gaps in European inventories and, therefore, one of the most pressing armament priorities.
In addition to AMD systems, NATO members in Europe need what has been prohibited to Ukraine: long-range conventional weapons that could take out targets in Russia from which deadly attacks against civilian targets could be launched, such as military command centres, airfields, launching platforms, and ammunition depots. The aim is to deny Russia such strike options – deterrence by denial. An additional strategic deterrent effect arises from the fact that the missiles in question are American systems on European soil. If Russia were to attack them, it would immediately be at war with the US, a war it could not win. And Russia’s territory would not remain a sanctuary; it would face the risk of incalculable damage to itself. In sum, the logic of NATO’s 1979 dual-track decision does not apply and linking the deployment of US missiles with arms control offers to the Russian aggressor would be misplaced.”
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Source link : https://europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/network-reflections-the-return-of-long-range-us-missiles-to-europe/
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Publish date : 2024-10-23 12:16:00
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