By
Léonie Allard and Jean-Loup Samaan
This summer threatened to upend French politics. European Parliament elections in early June saw strong support for the far right in France. Then, two rounds of French parliamentary elections resulted in left-leaning parties gaining ground. Bitter negotiations on forming a new government followed in August. As fall begins, however, a sense of, if not stability, then continuity has emerged in French politics. France now has a new government, and its lineup looks poised to stay the course on the most pressing foreign policy issues.
Be it for French support to Ukraine against Russian aggression, or Israel’s wars with Hamas and Hezbollah, or transatlantic relations, the team assembled by the new prime minister, Michel Barnier, is likely to follow the path French President Emmanuel Macron has set for the past few years. None of these foreign policy issues is likely to trigger a no confidence vote in the short term, as the stability of the present government will be decided on domestic issues. However, a drastically worsening of the crisis in Ukraine could in the medium term be used by the French far right to precipitate a political crisis.
An old-fashioned French conservative, Barnier largely agrees with the Macron philosophy of foreign policy. As a former foreign minister under President Jacques Chirac, Barnier comes from a generation of French politicians who cherish the idea of their country’s strategic autonomy and the use of the European Union (EU) as a steppingstone for French ambitions.
Barnier’s foreign policy team underscores this sense of continuity. Barnier and Macron agreed to keep Sebastien Lecornu, who has been the minister of the armed forces for the past two years. Another cabinet member, Jean-Noel Barrot, the centrist new foreign minister, was also a member of previous Macron governments. Barrot’s chief of staff, Aurelien Lechevallier, has been a close advisor of Macron since the latter ran for the presidency in 2017. Finally, the new minister in charge of European affairs, Benjamin Haddad, embraces similar views to the Elysée Palace. A former senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, Haddad has written extensively about the need for Europe to raise its ambitions amid Washington’s growing desire to reconsider its commitments toward transatlantic partners. This does not mean that the new government will antagonize the United States, but rather that it will likely stay close to Macron’s desire to reinforce strategic autonomy.
‘Strategic ambiguity’ in Ukraine
The most immediate issue for the new foreign policy team will be Ukraine. France will have to fulfill its responsibility in implementing commitments made at the 2024 Paris conference for Ukraine and in respecting its ten-year bilateral agreement on security cooperation with Ukraine, which was endorsed by the former National Assembly—despite disapproval from the far left. In the short term, this means ensuring the sustainability of bilateral aid (which has surpassed €1.3 billion in 2024) and EU financial aid (including by agreeing on a scheme for the seizure of immobilized Russian reserves). Paris will also need to continue the delivery of military equipment and the training of Ukrainian forces.
Keeping Lecornu on as the minister of the armed forces helps ensure that France will continue to commit to the operational needs of Ukraine. Lecornu played an important role in overseeing the adoption of the 2024-2030 military programming law, which shifted French support to Ukraine, and in overseeing the ramping up of industrial production at the national and European levels. Especially as politically sensitive domains of support have met only limited opposition from the far left and far right, France should continue delivering long-range weapons and training. The first group of Mirage 2000 pilots finished their training on September 20, and Paris aims to certify twenty-six pilots within two years. Meanwhile, the development of a brigade of 4,500 Ukrainian soldiers is ongoing.
In the past year, Macron toughened the French posture to help Ukraine and oppose Russian aggression. He put at the center of French action the doctrine of “strategic ambiguity.” As the battlefield constantly evolves, allies must show their adaptability, take the initiative, and create new strategic dilemmas for Russia, rather than draw red lines for themselves. France already allows Kyiv to strike beyond the frontlines into Russia against Russian assets directly hitting Ukrainian territory. Given the framework of strategic ambiguity, the doctrine of use surrounding French-acquired long-range missiles should evolve, but it wouldn’t necessarily mean an unrestricted green light.
At the diplomatic level, France will also have to reaffirm its credibility after months that saw Paris consumed by domestic politics. This is essential if Macron aims for his country to play a role in a ceasefire or peace plan. France’s 2024 conference for Ukraine explored the need to engage a discussion on the legal, political, military, and operational guarantees that would be needed for the security of Ukraine in the future. France should be able to rely on its defense partnership with a new Labour government in the United Kingdom, and it could also act as a bridge with Central and Eastern Europeans. Barrot and Haddad’s experience will be instrumental in that respect. In addition, Stephane Séjourné, the outgoing French foreign minister and candidate for the position of executive vice presidency of the EU Commission for Prosperity and Industrial Strategy, will be a major ally in Brussels.
A mediator in Lebanon
In the Middle East, France has struggled to keep a distinct voice. For the past year, Macron has tried to balance between expressing his solidarity with Israel following Hamas’s attacks on October 7, 2023, and condemning what he believes to be the heavy-handed response from the Israel Defense Forces in the Gaza Strip—as he did again in his speech at the UN General Assembly earlier this month.
A government led by the left-wing coalition would have tilted the scales, as members of parliament from Unsubmissive France (the coalition’s largest party) often talk of Israel’s “genocidal war” and pledged during the campaign to recognize Palestinian statehood. Barnier, who visited Israel twice since the war started, has largely stayed away from the heated debate. In fact, the tensions in Paris surrounding the Gaza war have less to do with the minor role played by the country than with its internal politics, as the Palestinian cause is often perceived through the lens of France’s complicated relationship with its Muslim community.
If France does not have much influence on the Gaza war, its mediating role in Lebanon remains important. France keeps close contact with the whole Lebanese political establishment (including Hezbollah) and the enduring presence of French troops within the framework of UN Interim Forces in Lebanon reflects the importance of the Middle Eastern country for Paris. Macron tried to launch a plan for the political and financial rescue of the country after the explosion of the Port of Beirut in August 2020—to no avail. The Lebanese issue does not polarize French politics the way Gaza or the Ukraine war does.
Tensions between Israel and Hezbollah were hardly mentioned during the elections last spring, and the few members of parliament who mentioned it merely repeated talking points about the need to enforce a ceasefire. Domestic politics may not be an issue on the Lebanese file, but the reality on the battleground still is: despite several attempts from France since last October to prevent escalation between Israel and Hezbollah (including Wednesday’s temporary ceasefire proposal coordinated with the United States), Paris has so far failed to get any concession from the warring parties.
All in all, the Barnier government is prone to carry on with most of the Macron agenda on foreign policy. But the real issue is to determine if the delicate political context in Paris allows the ministers to focus on the biggest issues such as Ukraine and Lebanon. Given the absence of a clear majority in parliament, ambitious foreign policy won’t be the priority of the Barnier government, despite Macron’s global ambitions. Domestic politics such as the economy or migration will likely shape the political agenda in Paris more than international crises.
Léonie Allard is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, previously serving at the French Ministry of Armed Forces.
Jean-Loup Samaan is a senior research fellow at the Middle East Institute of the National University of Singapore, as well as a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.
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Image: French Prime Minister Michel Barnier and members of the new French government at a meeting at the Hotel Matignon in Paris, France on September 23, 2024. Photo by Eric Tschaen/Pool/ABACAPRESS.COM
Source link : https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/frances-new-government-aims-to-calm-the-political-storm-what-will-it-mean-for-foreign-policy/
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Publish date : 2024-09-26 07:00:00
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