Trump’s welcome by a swathe of people in non-Western countries may well be driven by an enthusiasm for winners. These warm attitudes could change quickly, perhaps because of Trump’s tariff policies, or if he falls short of publics’ expectations around ending conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. But we think that these findings point to something more profound than the natural tendency to celebrate the victor: the publics’ embrace of a much more transactional world. Rumours have circulated for some time of the liberal international order’s slow death; this poll provides more evidence of its passing.
Our 2023 survey of the same countries outside Europe suggested the emergence of an “à la carte world”, in which great and “middle” powers seek partners transactionally in pursuit of their own national interests. The monogamous marriages of the cold war period are now history and middle powers have embraced polyamorous relationships, favouring different partners for different issues.
The weakening of the West is visible in its dramatic failure to isolate Moscow globally after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. Many countries exhibit a remarkably strong acceptance of Russia as an ally or necessary partner, despite nearly three years of Russia waging a brutal neocolonial war in Ukraine. The number of Indians and Chinese who consider Russia to be their country’s ally has even marginally grown since January 2023. Average American opinion of Russia has also improved, even if a majority continues to see Russia as either a rival or an adversary.
And in a number of non-Western countries—China, India, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey—most people expect Russia’s global influence to grow in the next decade; this is also the view of nearly half of the population in Brazil and Indonesia. In short, it seems that it is losing wars rather than starting them that damages your standing with public opinion in much of the world.
At the same time, Russians and Chinese are much more united in their mutual appreciation than Europeans and Americans. The perception of Russia in China has strengthened marginally since the end of 2022, but so has the perception of China in Russia. This makes this couple a rare “entente cordiale” in today’s global politics.
By contrast, in the “Western alliance”, just one in five Europeans say they view the US as an ally. This is down significantly from two years ago, and is half the proportion of Americans who view the EU as an ally. Indeed, the number of Americans who see the EU as an ally (a prevailing view) has remained steady, and the share of those who regard it as a necessary partner has grown from a quarter to a third.
We identified five “tendencies” for how people view Trump’s return. The first are the Trump Welcomers. They view Trump’s election victory as good for Americans and for peace in the world. This attitude is widespread in India and Saudi Arabia, but also popular in Russia, South Africa, China and Brazil. Most Trump Welcomers also see the incoming president as good for their own country.
At the other extreme are the Never Trumpers—those who see his victory as bad for Americans and for peace in the world. The Never Trumpers are a very rare breed globally, and they are concentrated in Europe—notably the United Kingdom, where they constitute half the public. They often represent the progressive opponents of Trump (not just in Europe but also in Brazil, South Korea and Turkey). Most Never Trumpers also regard Trump’s return to the presidency as bad for their own country.
The three other tendencies represent more nuanced views of Trump’s potential impact on global politics.
Some regard Trump as better for peace in the world than for American citizens. In other words, they doubt that Trump is good for Americans, but they see his election as an opportunity to bring current conflicts to an end. We call them the Peace-seekers. They are particularly numerous in China, but are also a sizeable group in Switzerland and Ukraine (a special case, which we discuss further below).
The fourth tendency consists of those who believe Trump’s election is worse for peace in the world than it is for American citizens. They often live in places that may be endangered by the United States’ withdrawal from a more activist global role. Half of South Koreans belong to this tendency. But such a standpoint can also be discerned in Turkey, Indonesia, South Africa, Brazil and Ukraine. Many of them are ideologically on the right of the political spectrum—but they seem to be pessimistic about the likely effects of Trump’s foreign policy. In that sense, they may be described as the Conflicted.
The last are the Uncertains, who are reserving judgment about what Trump means for American citizens or for world peace. They do not commit on these two questions. This “wait and see” attitude is commonest in Ukraine and Russia—two countries that have good reason to avoid drawing premature conclusions about Trump.
These attitudes may reflect a big change in the understanding of the United States’ global role. Under Trump, America will no longer aim to spread its values and act as a global defender of the liberal international order. The broad global welcome to Trump could herald the end of the US as a “liberal leviathan”, to recall John Ikenberry’s striking phrase.
The United States as a “normal” great power
Many in the non-Western world may view Trump’s victory as good news. But they do not see it as the start of “Making America Great Again”. They expect China to be at least as competitive.
The poll demonstrates that most people around the world see America as a continuing superpower or as one whose influence could still grow.
However, people expect China—rather than America—to become the world’s strongest power. Majorities hold this view everywhere except for Ukraine, South Korea, India and America itself. Even in the US, as many people say China will become the strongest country as those who say it will not.
Surprisingly, despite the cross-party consensus in the US on the strategic threat from China, most Americans believe their country’s relations with China will either stay unchanged or actually improve in the next five years. Chinese people too are hopeful that bilateral relations will remain steady or get better. Yet more surprisingly, perhaps, the prevailing view in both the US and China is that Trump’s arrival could well ease tensions. But there is a more negative view of the US in China—around half of Chinese view America as either a rival or an adversary. In contrast, only just over one-third of Americans hold a corresponding view about China.
The globally anticipated rise of China suggests Trump’s return comes as US geopolitical exceptionalism is beginning to recede. People may reasonably believe his foreign policy to be geared towards the national interest above all else. If the president executes this policy as expected, it would mean his country behaving as a more “normal” great power—one more like the other great and middle powers of today (except the EU!), and more like great powers in earlier periods of history.
Biden’s wars versus Trump’s promise of peace
Ending the war in Ukraine “in 24 hours” was one of Trump’s election promises. He has made similar bold claims about conflict in the Middle East. What do people in different parts of the world make of his chances?
In most countries surveyed, the largest share of public opinion holds Trump to be a peacemaker. Many—especially in India, Saudi Arabia, Russia, China, South Africa and the US itself—expect his administration to bring current conflicts to an end. However, fewer share this view in Europe and South Korea.
Trump’s peacemaker reputation matters because of the way America is seen as closely tied to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. In countries as diverse as China, India and Turkey, significant numbers view the conflicts as part of a broader face-off between the West and Russia, or between democracies and autocracies.
Outside Russia and China, few people globally believe that only Ukraine is responsible for the war continuing, or that it is more responsible for this than Russia. But—handily for Putin—many people in major non-Western powers (especially in India, Indonesia, China and Saudi Arabia) consider Russia and Ukraine to be equally responsible for the war continuing. This starting point could boost support in such countries for forcing Ukraine to make major concessions to reach a compromise settlement.
Such a settlement is the outcome that people everywhere (except for Russia) already see as the most likely.
A humiliating peace is clearly not the preference of Ukraine’s Western allies. Roughly one-third of those asked in the US and the UK, and a quarter in the EU, continue to express support for Ukraine to win outright, including to recover the territories currently occupied by Russia. Another quarter in the EU, the UK and the US would favour a peace deal that involves Ukraine being offered NATO membership. Such an outcome could be seen as a Ukrainian victory—and certainly as a compromise very favourable for Ukraine and unfavourable for Russia.
What is really new is the evolution of opinion in Ukraine itself. In just half a year, the expectation of victory has plummeted from well over half those asked in May 2024 to barely more than one-third by November the same year. Most Ukrainians now say they expect a compromise settlement.
As we have seen earlier, slightly more people in Ukraine believe that peace is likelier under Trump than think it is less likely.
But those Ukrainians who think Trump’s return makes peace likelier do not necessarily agree on how the war will end—and, therefore, what sort of peace is under discussion. One-third of them (corresponding to just over one in ten Ukrainians) expect Ukraine to win the war. They may hope Trump will give Ukraine the increased and bolder military support that they became increasingly frustrated at not receiving from the Biden administration. Still, most of this group (corresponding to one in five Ukrainians) expect the war to end in a compromise settlement. They may have accepted the impossibility of recovering all the territory within the 1991 borders for the foreseeable future. But they might have maintained hope that the territory the Ukrainian government still controls could join Western institutions, with both EU membership and either NATO membership or NATO-like security commitments from a European coalition of the willing.
However, there is no consensus in Ukrainian society on the nature of an acceptable compromise. Such disagreements could stoke political turmoil if and when negotiations begin.
A new strategy for Europe in a transactional world
Remembering Trump’s first term, some Europeans still fondly imagine themselves aligning with many other countries around the world in their alarm at his return to the White House. This time, however, Europeans are almost alone in their scepticism of Trump, in contrast to opinion elsewhere in the world.
While global perceptions of the US as an enduring superpower remain largely unaltered, what has changed significantly is America’s expected positioning in the international system. In our poll carried out in late 2022—with the Biden administration standing shoulder to shoulder with Europe in outrage at Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—it was still possible to discern a “united West”—although one already clearly “divided from the Rest” in response to that conflict.
With Trump’s return, however, the West is divided. Divisions run not just between the US and Europe (and other US allies such as South Korea) but also inside the EU, as a forthcoming ECFR polling report will demonstrate. All European countries are divided internally on Trump’s return—and several south-eastern European countries among the 11 EU member states in our survey stand out for their more welcoming attitudes. Indeed, it may no longer be possible to speak of “the West” as a single geopolitical actor.
The big challenge for Europeans is therefore to find their own place in a more à la carte, zero-sum world. European leaders would not just be wrong to believe that Trump’s victory will necessarily bring Europeans together. Any attempt by the EU to achieve unity in direct opposition to Trump could lead to major divisions both between and within the member states.
However, this survey identifies three trends that could help guide European decision-makers during the second Trump presidency.
First, the poll shows that Europeans are aware of their distinctive interests when it comes to relations with the US, but also with other powers. They view the US as the EU’s main friend and Russia as its main enemy, and they still broadly consider others—Turkey, China and India—to be necessary partners for the EU.
Second, people around the world see the EU as a major global power. Majorities in most countries consider the bloc capable of dealing on equal terms with the US and China. Ironically enough, the people who believe least in European power are the Europeans themselves, including the British and the Swiss.
What is more, while Europe is uniquely challenged in a Trumpian, transactional world, many expect the EU’s global influence to grow or at least remain as strong as today. Again, people in Europe are often more disbelieving on this point than citizens elsewhere.
Third, the poll highlights several potential partnerships for Europeans. In countries such as Brazil, India and South Africa, people broadly see the EU as both powerful and as an ally or a partner. The recent EU-Mercosur trade agreement shows the kind of deals that a more united EU could make.
There is also significant potential for strategic partnering between the EU and the UK, especially when it comes to the war in Ukraine and European security; and with Turkey, especially when it comes to the Middle East.
As this poll shows, in its attitudes and priorities, the UK remains a European country. Another recent ECFR poll also showed clearly that citizens in both the UK and the EU favour a closer relationship, faced with the threat of Putin and the challenge of Trump.
Turkey—a very popular middle power (most other countries surveyed regard it chiefly as a partner)—is another country where seeking a more effective partnership should, in our view, become one of the EU’s most urgent priorities. Ankara is not an easy partner for Brussels, but a rapprochement could boost the EU’s influence in shaping the new Middle East order, beneficially influence the expected Russia-Ukraine negotiations, and strengthen the bloc’s influence in Africa.
What the EU must do to be taken seriously by Trump’s White House closely resembles what it must do to make friends and influence people globally. Rather than posing as a moral arbiter of everyone else’s behaviour, Europe should build its domestic strength and seek new bilateral partnerships to defend its own values and interests in a transactional world.
Methodology
This report is based on a public opinion poll of adult populations (aged 18 and over) conducted in November 2024 in 16 European countries (Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom), and eight non-European countries (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea and the United States). The total number of respondents was 28,549.
In Russia, Turkey and all countries outside Europe the polls were conducted by Gallup International Association through a network of independent local partners and cross-country panel operators as an online survey in: Brazil (1,000; 18-25 November; through MarketAnalysis); China (1,005 respondents; 12-21 November; through Distance/Dynata); Indonesia (1,000; 15-20 November; through DEKA); Russia (1,000; 14-25 November; through Be Media Consultant); Saudi Arabia (1,002; 13-22 November; through Distance/Dynata); South Africa (1,010; 12-21 November; through Distance/Dynata); South Korea (1,000; 13-17 November; through Gallup Korea); Turkey (1,005; 12-21 November; through Distance/Dynata); and the US (1,012; 15 November; through Distance/Survey Monkey). The method in India was the face-to-face survey (1,008; 20 November-4 December; through Convergent). The choice of face-to-face surveys in India was directed by the poor quality of internet in India’s smaller cities.
In Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey and the US the sample was nationally representative of basic demographics. In China, the poll included panellists only from the country’s four biggest agglomerations: Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai and Shenzhen. In India, rural areas and tier-3 cities were not covered. And in Russia, only cities of at least 100,000 inhabitants were covered. Therefore, data from China, India and Russia should be considered as representative only for the population covered by the poll. Besides, considering a politically sensitive character of several questions, the results from China, Russia and Saudi Arabia need to be interpreted with caution, bearing in mind the possibility that some respondents might have felt constrained in expressing their opinions freely.
In the remaining European countries, the polls were conducted online by Datapraxis and YouGov in Bulgaria (1,014; 7-29 November); Denmark (1,099; 7-26 November); France (2,017; 7 November – 2 December); Germany (2,003; 7-28 November); Hungary (1,023; 7-28 November); Italy (1,531; 7-29 November); Poland (1,063; 7-29 November); Portugal (1,000; 7-27 November); Romania (1,010; 7-26 November); Spain (1,030; 7-27 November); Switzerland (1,082; 8-26 November), and the UK (2,073; 7-26 November). Polls were conducted by Datapraxis and Norstat in Estonia (1,061; 11 November-5 December). In Ukraine, polls were conducted by DataPraxis and Rating Group in Ukraine (1,501; 15-20 November) via telephone interviews (CATI), with respondents selected using randomly generated telephone numbers. The data was then weighted to basic demographics. Fully accounting for the population changes due to the war is difficult, but adjustments have been made to account for the territory under Russian occupation. This, combined with the probability-based sampling approach, strengthens the level of representativeness of the survey and generally reflects the attitudes of Ukrainian public opinion in wartime conditions.
In this policy brief, and unless stated otherwise, the results for “the EU” correspond to a simple average across 11 EU member states within the sample (ie, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Spain).
The segmentation into different “attitudes towards Trump” used in this paper is based on responses to two questions: “Do you think the election of Donald Trump as president of the US is a good or bad thing for American citizens?” and “Do you think the election of Donald Trump as president of the US is a good or bad thing for peace in the world?” For each of these questions, available options included: “very good thing”, “rather good thing”, “neither good nor bad thing”, “rather bad thing”, “very bad thing”, and “don’t know”. Respondents were put into five different categories based on the following criteria:
“Trump welcomers”—if they chose “very good thing” or “rather good thing” to each of the questions;
“Never Trumpers”—if they chose “very bad thing” or “rather bad thing” to each of the questions;
“Uncertains”—if they chose “neither good nor bad thing” to each of the questions;
“Peace seekers—if they chose “very good thing” or “rather good thing” on what Trump represents for peace in the world, while choosing “very bad thing”, “rather bad thing”, or “neither good nor bad thing” on what he means for the American citizens; or if they chose “neither good nor bad thing” on what he represents for peace in the world, while choosing “very bad thing” or “rather bad thing” on what he means for American citizens;
“The conflicted”—if they chose “very good thing” or “rather good thing” on what Trump represents for American citizens, while choosing “very bad thing”, “rather bad thing”, or “neither good nor bad thing” on what he means for peace in the world; or if they chose “neither good nor bad thing” on what he represents for American citizens, while choosing “very bad thing” or “rather bad thing” on what he means for peace in the world.
The remaining respondents—who chose “Don’t know” to at least one of the two questions—were not put into any of these five categories, being instead considered as “The rest”.
The table below provides a graphical representation of the above-mentioned segmentation.
About the authors
Timothy Garton Ash is professor emeritus of European Studies at the University of Oxford and a founding member of ECFR. His most recent book is “Homelands: A Personal History of Europe”.
Ivan Krastev is chair of the Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, and a permanent fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna. He is the author of “Is It Tomorrow Yet?: Paradoxes of the Pandemic”, among many other publications.
Mark Leonard is co-founder and director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of “The Age of Unpeace: How Connectivity Causes Conflict”. He also presents ECFR’s weekly “World in 30 Minutes” podcast.
Acknowledgments
This publication would not have been possible without the extraordinary work of ECFR’s Unlock team, in particular Pawel Zerka who did an extraordinary job of analysing the data to illuminate key trends and to help the authors sharpen their arguments. Adam Harrison was a brilliant editor of various drafts and has greatly improved the narrative flow of the text. Andreas Bock led on strategic media outreach and Nastassia Zenovich on visualising the data. Susi Dennison and Josef Lolacher made sensitive and useful suggestions on the substance, while Anand Sundar helped us navigate our way through successive drafts. Despite these many and varied contributions, any mistakes remain the authors’ own.
This polling and analysis was the result of a collaboration between ECFR and the Europe in a Changing World project of the Dahrendorf Programme at St Antony’s College, University of Oxford. ECFR partnered with Stiftung Mercator, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, Think Tank Europa, and the International Center for Defence and Security on this project.
This paper is a part of Re:Order and was made possible with the support of Stiftung Mercator, but does not necessarily represent the views of it.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.
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Publish date : 2025-01-15 00:25:00
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