The Finnish authorities reacted quickly and decisively after the suspected sabotage of undersea cables, boarding a suspicious ship in the Baltic Sea. Europe must be prepared to follow this example.
Forceful images of Finland’s intervention: The authorities published images of their action against the oil tanker Eagle S, which may have deliberately damaged undersea cables. This photo was taken on Dec. 28.
Finnish Border Guard via EPA
NZZ.ch benötigt JavaScript für wichtige Funktionen. Ihr Browser oder Adblocker verhindert dies momentan.
Bitte passen Sie die Einstellungen an.
It only took Finland’s security forces a few hours to act. On Dec. 25 at exactly 12.26 p.m., a malfunction occurred in the Baltic Sea on the Estlink 2 submarine cable, which connects the power grids of Finland and Estonia. That evening, the Finnish Border Guard patrol vessel Turva contacted the oil tanker Eagle S, which was on its way to Egypt from the Russian port of Ust-Luga. Shortly after midnight on Dec. 26, security forces took control of the ship.
The Eagle S is suspected of having deliberately damaged the Estlink 2 power cable and other submarine cables. The oil tanker is said to have slowed down and made several unusual maneuvers at the site of the damaged cable. When Finnish authorities boarded the ship, they found that the anchors were missing. The Eagle S sails under the Cook Islands flag, but it is thought to be part of the Russian shadow fleet, which transports oil out of Russia.
This was not the first time that a ship has damaged an undersea cable in the Baltic Sea – suspicions of sabotage by Russia loom large. But the case of the Eagle S is different. This time, Finland responded quickly and decisively, which has not always been the case.
In mid-November, two data cables were damaged. Suspicion fell on the Chinese cargo ship Yi Peng 3, which was briefly detained but has since sailed to Port Said in Egypt.
The Chinese freighter Yi Peng 3 on Nov. 20 in the Kattegat off Denmark after the ship presumably damaged a gas pipeline and cables in the Baltic Sea.
Mikkel Berg Pedersen / Scanpix / Reuters
A year earlier, in October 2023, the Chinese ship Newnew Polar Bear damaged the Balticconnector gas pipeline and several data cables in the Baltic Sea. It took days before the ship came to the attention of Finnish investigators. In the meantime, China has confirmed that the Newnew Polar Bear did indeed damage the pipeline, supposedly unintentionally during a storm.
The vulnerability of undersea cables to sabotage has long been a recognized risk – certainly since the Nordstream pipelines were blown up in the fall of 2022. Yet, the Baltic Sea states appear to have been caught off guard.
Finland, however, has demonstrated the importance of decisive action. The response of the Finnish security authorities can serve as an example for Europe as a whole.
Thanks to Finland’s swift intervention, the tanker Eagle S has remained in Finnish territorial waters. The local authorities there have access to the ship in accordance with maritime law and can, for example, question the crew or analyze equipment on board.
In addition, the Finnish authorities likely averted further damage. Had the Eagle S continued unhindered, it could have also damaged the Balticconnector pipeline and the Estlink 1 cable.
Finland sends a signal of strength to Russia
But perhaps the most important aspect of Finland’s response – more critical than holding specific individuals to account – is the clear message it is sending. In previous incidents, the affected countries appeared insecure and helpless. This is one of the key goals of the attackers in such covert sabotage operations.
Intelligence services are generally behind such attacks. They want to stir up uncertainty. Blame is difficult to determine, and there is often no clear evidence of state involvement. This gray area makes a proportionate response difficult.
However, Finland managed to send out a signal of strength on Dec. 25. Although it was Christmas Day, the authorities identified the suspicious vessel within hours, obtained permission to board it and launched a coordinated operation involving border guards, armed forces and police units. In the middle of the night, the armed forces stormed the ship from two helicopters.
Finland has made its position clear: it considers the incident an act of sabotage and has shown that its security forces are not to be underestimated. Sources indicated that the authorities were prepared for resistance. It doesn’t matter how likely this was. The decisive factor is the signal to the other side.
Finland’s determination to set an example is evident in its communication strategy. Starting on Dec. 26, the police published a daily report on developments at the Eagle S. There were also multiple news conferences in which the authorities confidently explained their approach.
A Finnish Border Guard Super Puma helicopter with two officers on the deck of the tanker Eagle S. It is not entirely clear whether the photo was taken during the storming of the ship on the night of Dec. 26.
Then there is the power of imagery. The Finnish police have released footage of the operations, showing emergency services abseiling onto the Eagle S and ships and helicopters accompanying the tanker. The authorities were just as assertive in shaping the narrative as they were in their actions at sea.
Finland has correctly acknowledged that sabotage activity can have a significant psychological component. In some cases, the goal is not merely to disrupt specific infrastructure but to intimidate the other side.
The oil tanker Eagle S under observation by the Finnish Border Guard patrol vessel Turva, photographed on the morning of Dec. 26. Russia conducts covert operations against Europe
In recent months, Russia appears to have stepped up its covert operations in Europe and is adopting increasingly brazen tactics. There were several arson attacks on warehouses and shopping centers. In Germany and the U.K., parcels being shipped via DHL ignited and started larger fires. Moscow is even said to have planned an assassination attempt against the head of the Rheinmetall armaments group.
In addition, suspicious drone flights over industrial plants and military bases have fueled unease in Germany and the U.S. Such flights can indeed serve to spy on these installations, but they also have a strong psychological effect. The drone missions show above all the deficits that the security forces have in the area of detection, tracking and defense against drones.
Russia is in conflict with the West. Moscow is using hybrid warfare against European states because of its support for Ukraine in the war – but that is not the only reason. It would be disastrous to think that Russia would simply cease its covert operations after a ceasefire in Ukraine. The Kremlin’s broader goal is to undermine the European security architecture as a whole.
Europe must therefore learn how to respond to Russia’s hybrid attacks. Finland’s approach in the case of the Eagle S highlights three important points:
Rapid and coordinated action: In Finland, the relevant organizations – the company operating the cables, the security forces and the judiciary – were able to respond quickly. They were obviously prepared for possible sabotage and had a corresponding plan. This cooperation is also needed across national borders, for example to track drone flights or conduct joint investigations into arson attacks in several countries.Strong and decisive reaction: The Finnish security forces acted decisively and stormed the Eagle S. They assumed the scenario of a state-controlled act of sabotage – the worst case – even if there was not yet any clear evidence. This proactive approach is crucial. In the current political situation, the security forces in Europe must assume that such disruptions are tied to covert operations by Russian intelligence services. Anything else is dangerous naivete.Clear and assertive communication: The Finnish authorities have openly communicated their suspicions and how they have proceeded. They also made it clear that security of the electricity supply was not at risk. This sends an important signal to the public. The population learns of the threat and is aware of the countermeasures. This can counteract the uncertainty that the opposing side wants to trigger. This approach also strips the attacker’s action of ambiguity that often lends such covert operations by intelligence services their potency.
Finland has shown Europe what a single country can do. However, going forward, a unified approach by European states will be even more important. Governments must develop a common political stance and prepare possible responses to Russia’s hybrid actions. Ideally, this should be done in coordination with the NATO defense alliance.
With its hybrid attacks, the Kremlin wants to undermine Europe’s unity and test NATO’s ability to respond. The West therefore needs a set of instruments to be able to react quickly, consistently and appropriately to the Kremlin’s covert operations – as soon as possible.
Latest articles
Global reporting. Swiss-quality journalism.
In today’s increasingly polarized media market, the Switzerland-based NZZ offers a critical and fact-based outside view. We are not in the breaking-news business. We offer thoughtful, well-researched stories and analyses that go behind the headlines to explain relevant events in the U.S., in Europe and worldwide. To produce this work, the NZZ maintains an industry-leading network of expert reporters around the globe who work closely with our main newsroom in Zurich.
Sign up for our free newsletter or follow us on Twitter, Facebook or WhatsApp.
Source link : http://www.bing.com/news/apiclick.aspx?ref=FexRss&aid=&tid=6785d8bf050944faaaf11f1479b90ac6&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nzz.ch%2Fenglish%2Ffinland-shows-europe-how-to-respond-to-the-kremlins-hybrid-attacks-ld.1865673&c=10604207136471373448&mkt=de-de
Author :
Publish date : 2025-01-13 06:35:00
Copyright for syndicated content belongs to the linked Source.
