Putin’s war is dividing German society and weakening its economy. Berlin has a stake in securing peace sooner rather than later – but at what cost?
A majority of Germans are in favor of arms deliveries to Ukraine. Here, a poster with the inscription «Stand with Ukraine» at Berlin’s central train station in March 2022.
Imago
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Since last weekend’s Munich Security Conference, Europe has come to a stark realization: It is largely on its own. The new U.S. government has made clear that it wants to end the war in Ukraine through a compromise with Vladimir Putin. The task of upholding a «peace» potentially negotiated over their heads would then fall to the Europeans. The outrage was correspondingly great. Crisis summits were hastily convened.
However, for Germany, Europe’s largest economy and most influential power, the picture is more complex than the alarm sounded in Munich by politicians such as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Defense Minister Boris Pistorius (both SPD) and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock (Greens).
It is rather the case that Germany finds itself in a strategic dilemma due to the Russian war in Ukraine.
On the one hand, there is broad agreement across Germany’s mainstream parties that Russia should not be allowed to get away with its land grab in Ukraine. This could have serious geopolitical consequences for the international order. If Putin succeeds, he and other autocrats around the world could feel emboldened to take further action against neighboring countries. In the case of Russia, for example, Moldova, Georgia or even NATO’s Baltic members – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – could become targets, raising the specter of a major war in Europe.
On the other hand, the clear pro-Ukrainian stance, the arms deliveries and the sanctions against Russia have significant consequences for Germany. The economy is struggling under the weight of high energy prices, while the pro-Ukrainian course is fueling support for populist fringe parties. The longer the war drags on, the greater the strain on Germany’s economic and social stability.
Cardinal errors in dealing with Russia
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, the Western goal has been to weaken Moscow militarily and economically enough to force it to end the war. The assumption in Berlin is that a tough stance in the short term will lead to a long-term, diplomatically negotiated peace in Europe. That strategy has not gone to plan.
Several cardinal mistakes in this war were already made before its outbreak. Germany played a decisive role here. When building the Nord Stream I and II gas pipelines, the Christian Democrat government of Angela Merkel apparently accepted the risk that Russia would use the revenues to fill its war chest and prepare for the invasion of Ukraine. As the recently published book «Nord Stream. How Germany is Paying for Putin’s War» lays out, this was clear to the Chancellery in Berlin.
Compounding the problem is Germany’s long-running appeasement policy toward the Kremlin. Until recently, Social Democrats in particular believed they could contain Putin, especially through economic integration. Instead, he saw Berlin’s reluctance to push back as a green light for his belligerent course of action.
Germany has put itself into the strategic dilemma in which it now finds itself, together with Europe. The consequences are profound.
The war in Ukraine, combined with the rise of populist parties, is making it increasingly difficult to form stable political majorities in Germany. A few days before the Bundestag elections on Sunday, the far-right AfD party is stable at around 20%.
The AfD benefits from the war in Ukraine
The rise of the AfD is primarily due to irregular migration. However, their opposition to military aid for Ukraine and concerns over the war’s economic fallout have also played a role. The party is capitalizing on growing public fatigue with the war.
German society is divided between those who favor a quick peace through negotiations and those who are counting on Russia’s defeat. However, there is still a majority in favor of arms deliveries to Ukraine.
And it is not only the AfD that owes its rise in part to the government’s Ukraine policy. The left-wing populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) and the Left Party are also trying to capitalize on Germans’ concerns about an ongoing war, presenting themselves as staunchly «peace» parties.
Like the AfD, they benefit from the consequences of war. The end of the supply of cheap gas from Russia has led to an increase in energy prices and thus to a higher cost of living in Germany. This affects low-income households in particular. The AfD, BSW and the Left are suggesting that gas supplies from Russia can be reactivated quickly if peace is achieved quickly. This would reduce energy costs.
The BSW and the Left have been hovering around the 5% threshold in recent opinion polls, the minimum needed to secure seats in the Bundestag. Whether they make the cut will only become clear on election night. If they do, forming a stable government is likely to be even more difficult than it already is. The failed traffic light coalition shows how the ideological differences between the individual parties can paralyze German politics.
At the same time, the loss of Russian gas supplies due to the war has been a key driver of Germany’s energy crisis. Companies that need cheap energy to remain competitive are relocating parts of their production abroad. The longer the war lasts, the greater the risk of further deindustrialization in Germany.
Germany faces challenges
However, the opposite assumption has its pitfalls too. If Trump were to succeed in negotiating peace between Russia and Ukraine, this would not necessarily mean that cheap gas from Russia would soon be flowing to Germany again.
Firstly, it would mean doing business with war criminals. And secondly, it would once again buoy Russia’s military budget, which could then be directed not only against Ukraine, but also against NATO – and thus against Germany itself.
The defense policy consequences of the war in Ukraine must therefore also be considered. In the coming years, Germany will have to invest enormous sums in the military to restore its ability to defend itself. This expenditure will force politicians to set new priorities in the national budget. This could lead to further social upheaval.
Germany is also faced with the question of how to meet the increasing demand for soldiers. Reintroducing conscription – or even a broader compulsory service for young men and women – could become a divisive issue. However, in view of the developments in Munich last weekend, there is hardly any way around higher defense spending and a new military model.
European soldiers in Ukraine?
The new U.S. administration made two things clear at the Munich Security Conference. First, Europe will have to provide significantly more troops and equipment and, second, the Europeans will have to shoulder the primary responsibility for enforcing any future ceasefire in Ukraine.
Germany’s former defense minister, Boris Pistorius, has repeatedly signaled that deploying Bundeswehr troops as part of such a force is a possibility. Experts say that models for a Ukraine force are circulating in the Ministry of Defense in Berlin, according to which Germany would have to provide up to 50,000 soldiers.
This, too, is part of the strategic dilemma in which Germany finds itself. It may have to conduct a military operation for a long time that is costly and personnel-intensive, perhaps even with heavy losses, and whose long-term prospects are unclear as things stand today.
Whether Russia is really willing to honor a peace treaty concluded with Trump also depends on the military deterrence capability of the Europeans. Since the annexation of Crimea more than 10 years ago, the Europeans have had time to build up this capability. But they have not done enough. Now, they face the prospect of going it alone.
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Publish date : 2025-02-21 02:16:00
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